R v Ibnat Khan

On a reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, a sentence may be merciful, and a longer immediate custodial sentence may properly have been imposed, without being unduly lenient. The question is whether the sentence fell outside the range reasonably available to the sentencing judge.

In sentencing young adults, age and lack of maturity may justify substantial mitigation, particularly where offending reflects impulsive and reckless behaviour. Genuine remorse and voluntary professional assistance may also bear on future risk. Delay between detection and sentence cannot itself justify a reduction where it was not caused by hesitation to plead guilty, although its limited significance may be assessed alongside youth and life stage. Once a sentence is capable of suspension, the Imposition Guideline must be applied.

The Attorney General referred under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 a sentence imposed by HHJ Darling at the Inner London Crown Court on 5 November 2025. The offender had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity to four sexual offences involving a 15-year-old pupil whom she had mentored as a learning support assistant.

The offences involved a four-month relationship, repeated sexual activity, grooming, abuse of a position of trust, sexual communications and possession of indecent photographs. The judge imposed an aggregate sentence of two years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, together with protective orders. The central issue was whether that sentence was merely lenient or was unduly lenient and should be increased.

Leave to refer was granted, but the sentence was not increased.

1. Under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Court considered whether the sentence was unduly lenient. A sentence could properly be described as merciful, and a longer immediate custodial sentence could have been imposed, while remaining within the range available to the sentencing judge. In that event it was not unduly lenient.
2. The four-year guideline starting point warranted an upward adjustment to reflect the duration of the offending and the number of offences. It also warranted substantial mitigation. The offender’s age and lack of maturity were particularly significant because the conduct displayed impulsive, irresponsible and reckless risk-taking. Her genuine remorse and voluntary search for professional assistance were relevant both to mitigation and to the assessment of future risk.
3. The period between detection and sentencing could not itself justify any adjustment because it was not attributable to hesitation in entering a guilty plea. In the circumstances, however, that period was not irrelevant when considered alongside the offender’s age, immaturity and stage of life. Its weight was limited.
4. Once the sentence had reached a length at which suspension was legally available, the judge was required to follow and apply the Imposition Guideline. His reasoning on suspension could not be faulted. The protective orders imposed were also relevant to managing the risk posed to children.
5. Although immediate imprisonment would follow in almost all cases involving sexual exploitation of a child by school staff, this was a highly unusual case. The judge had carefully balanced the aggravating and mitigating features and reached a sentence within the available range. The reference therefore did not justify interference, and the sentence remained in force.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 27 January 2026, leave was granted for the Attorney General’s reference, but the court declined to interfere with the sentence: [2026] EWCA Crim 200.
• Inner London Crown Court: On 5 November 2025, HHJ Darling imposed two years’ imprisonment suspended for two years, with protective orders.