R v Adam Culverwell

A care worker may commit an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 while on sick leave. The relevant question is whether, at the time of the sexual activity, the worker had employment functions which had brought, or were likely to bring, them into regular face-to-face contact with the patient. The worker need not be performing those functions or be in face-to-face contact at that time. Where the material facts are undisputed, the legal effect of sick leave is for the judge, not the jury. Section 42(4) raises a different, conduct-based question which may require a jury. For multiple offences sentenced concurrently, lead sentences must reflect totality.

The appellant, a community psychiatric nurse, was convicted under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 of sexual activity with, and causing or inciting sexual activity with, a person with a mental disorder by a care worker. Following a ruling by the Crown Court at Bournemouth on 10 April 2025, he pleaded guilty to six counts and was convicted after trial on two further counts. He was sentenced on 6 June 2025 to seven years’ imprisonment, with concurrent sentences.

He argued that the relevant sexual activity occurred while he was on sick leave and therefore outside section 38. He also challenged the sentence as manifestly excessive. The central issues were whether section 42(3) covered a care worker on sick leave, whether the issue was for the judge or jury, and whether the sentence was excessive.

The court granted the extension of time and leave to appeal against conviction. It dismissed the appeal against conviction and refused leave to appeal against sentence.

1. Statutory interpretation. The court applied ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. The statutory words have primacy, but must be read in their context and in a manner consistent with legislative purpose, following R (on the application of O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3; [2023] AC 255.
2. Section 42(3). Section 38 focuses on the contemporaneous involvement of the defendant in the patient’s care, while section 42(3) defines the required status. At the time of the sexual activity, the care worker must have relevant functions to perform in the course of employment which had brought, or were likely to bring, the worker into regular face-to-face contact with the patient. The functions need not be performed contemporaneously, and the face-to-face contact need not occur at the same time. A care worker on sick leave may therefore remain within section 42(3), provided the employment functions remain extant.
3. Judge and jury. The legal scope of section 42(3) was for the judge. Applying that interpretation to undisputed facts also left no factual issue for the jury in this case. The court recognised that factual questions may remain for juries in other cases. The court also accepted that a guilty plea did not bar a challenge where the judge’s ruling had withdrawn the only defence, citing R v Fouad Kakaei [2021] EWCA Crim 503.
4. Section 42(4). The court did not need to decide the section 42(4) issue. By way of assistance, it stated that subsection (4) requires consideration of whether the defendant acted as a provider of care, assistance or services during sick leave. That conduct-based question, applying ordinary meanings to facts not agreed or determined, was for the jury.
5. Sentence. The sentences were within the category 1A range. The guideline starting point applied to a single offence and did not limit the sentence required for multiple offences. Because the sentences were concurrent, the lead sentences had to reflect the totality of the offending. Grooming, sexual images, threats, duration and the complainant’s displacement were properly treated as aggravating features. The sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive.

The reporting restriction imposed under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was lifted with immediate effect.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 203, leave to appeal against conviction was granted after an extension of time, the conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
• Crown Court at Bournemouth: Following a ruling on 10 April 2025, the appellant pleaded guilty to six counts and was convicted after trial on two further counts. On 6 June 2025 he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, with concurrent sentences.