R v Shane Ryan Brooks

Evidence of a person other than the defendant is admissible under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only if it has substantial probative value concerning a matter in issue of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole. The threshold is higher than simple relevance or a general bearing on credibility. The assessment is fact-sensitive and primarily for the trial judge. Evidence may properly be excluded where it is unsubstantiated, remote, or would require collateral enquiries likely to distract the jury. On the facts, material concerning alleged lies and coercive behaviour did not meet the threshold. The conviction appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal sentence was refused.

Following a majority conviction at the Crown Court at Reading for two rapes, the appellant was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. The trial judge refused applications to adduce material concerning alleged dishonesty by the complainant and alleged coercive or controlling behaviour by her boyfriend. The appellant argued that the material was admissible as non-defendant bad-character evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 or, alternatively, as relevant evidence. He also sought leave to appeal against sentence.

The central issues were whether the proposed material had substantial probative value concerning matters of substantial importance and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Disposition. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. Leave to appeal against sentence was refused.
2. Admissibility framework. Under section 100(1)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the evidence had to have substantial probative value concerning a matter in issue which was of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole. The requirement was higher than simple relevance. The court applied the approach explained in R v BVY [2004] EWCA Crim 1355: the judge must assess whether the evidence substantially advances the point sought to be proved. The assessment is fact-sensitive and primarily for the trial judge. An appellate court should intervene only for a misdirection or a conclusion which no reasonable judge could have reached.
3. Collateral enquiries. The court also applied the concern identified in R v H [2011] EWCA Crim 303. A judge may prevent questioning which would explore remote or tangential matters, amount to a fishing expedition, or divert the trial into satellite litigation.
4. First category of material. Much of the social-services and psychological material was unattributed hearsay, general opinion, or ordinary teenage behaviour. The two specific alleged lies were unrelated to the events charged and had very limited probative value. Investigating the surrounding circumstances would have required collateral enquiries and additional evidence. The refusal of that material was therefore correct, although the court reached the conclusion by a different route from the trial judge.
5. Second category of material. If the allegation of coercive behaviour was true, it was not misconduct by the complainant, but it could potentially constitute misconduct by her boyfriend, who was a witness, and could bear on her motive to lie. However, the evidence already before the jury showed that the boyfriend had reacted angrily when she reported the incident. Further investigation of the allegation would have added no significant assistance and would have risked distracting the jury. It therefore failed the statutory threshold.
6. Sentence. The trial judge was best placed to assess the harm caused to both complainants and was entitled to place both offences in harm category 2. Consecutive sentences for two rapes of children were proper, subject to totality. The judge had adjusted the sentence accordingly, and the overall term was not manifestly excessive.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The conviction appeal was dismissed. Leave to appeal against sentence was refused, on [2026] EWCA Crim 410.
2. Crown Court at Reading: The appellant was convicted by a majority on two counts of rape on 2 April 2025 and sentenced on 17 April 2025 to a total of 12 years’ imprisonment.