R v Marcus Pottinger

For accessory liability to wounding with intent under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the required intention may be conditional. A jury may convict where the defendant assists or encourages the carrying of a loaded gun, sharing an intention that it be used to inflict really serious injury on a rival gang member if the opportunity arises, even if the particular victim has not been identified in advance. Liability may also arise from later encouragement after the victim is identified. An intention to cause really serious injury is distinct from an intention to endanger life. An acquittal on the latter charge is therefore not inconsistent with conviction under section 18.

Following a jury trial at the Central Criminal Court, the appellant was convicted of wounding with intent and possession of a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence. He was acquitted of attempted murder and possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life. He appealed, with leave, against the conviction for wounding with intent.

The prosecution case was that he assisted by smuggling a loaded gun into a nightclub and, alternatively, encouraged the shooter after the intended victim had been identified. The appeal concerned whether the prosecution case and jury directions permitted the conviction, whether the verdict was unreasonable, and whether it was inconsistent with the acquittal on the endangerment charge or with the acquittals of other defendants.

Appeal dismissed. The conviction was safe.

1. The court identified three possible routes to conviction. The first, based on a general intention to use the gun to inflict serious injury on someone in the club, was not advanced by the Crown and was not covered by the directions.
2. The principal prosecution case was that, when the loaded gun was smuggled into the club, the appellant shared a conditional intention that it would be used to inflict really serious injury on a rival gang member if the occasion arose. The jury could reach that conclusion even though the particular victim had not been identified in advance. The gang background, the involvement of acknowledged gang members, and the handling of the loaded gun provided a sufficient evidential basis. The conviction under count 4 also supported the conclusion that the appellant knew the bag contained a gun, and the jury could infer that it was loaded.
3. The directions were sufficient. Although they did not expressly use the phrase conditional intent throughout, paragraph 62 identified that basis of the Crown’s case and explained that it could support convictions on the relevant counts. The absence of any objection to the directions was also material.
4. The conviction was independently supportable on the alternative basis that the appellant encouraged the shooter after the victim had been identified. The closing speech and summing-up made that case sufficiently clear. The jury could infer assistance, encouragement and the necessary intention from the CCTV, the appellant’s conduct and conversation, and their rejection of his account. That was a permissible inference from the totality of the evidence, not impermissible speculation.
5. The acquittal on possession with intent to endanger life was not inconsistent with the section 18 conviction. A person may intend to cause really serious harm without intending to endanger life. Nor were the differing verdicts for the co-defendants inconsistent, since the jury had to consider each defendant separately and mere presence or hearing a conversation did not necessarily amount to encouragement.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 416, the appeal against conviction on count 2 was dismissed.
2. Central Criminal Court: Following trial before His Honour Judge Mayo KC and a jury, the appellant was convicted on counts 2 and 4 and acquitted on counts 1 and 3. No citation for the decision is stated in the judgment.