R v Jack Garwell

For causing death by dangerous driving, culpability categorisation must reflect the quality of the driving and decision-making on the occasion. Deliberately overtaking several vehicles in darkness without being able to judge whether the road was clear, together with speed significantly above the limit and inappropriate to the conditions, can amount to multiple category A factors. Personal mitigation is considered after categorisation. It may justify a substantial reduction, but does not reduce the culpability category. Sentencing remains a judgment rather than a mechanical mathematical exercise. On an Attorney General’s reference, an appellate court may quash a sentence that is unduly lenient and substitute the least sentence that properly reflects the offence and mitigation.

After pleading guilty at the first opportunity to causing death by dangerous driving, Jack Garwell was sentenced by the Crown Court at Sheffield on 28 November 2025 to three years and six months’ imprisonment. The Attorney General sought leave to refer the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that the offence should have been placed in category A rather than category B under the applicable sentencing guideline. The central issues were the proper culpability category, the effect of substantial personal mitigation and the guilty plea, and whether the sentence and associated driving disqualification were unduly lenient.

1. Reference allowed. The court granted leave, held that the sentence was unduly lenient, quashed the sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment and substituted six years’ imprisonment. It also quashed the period of disqualification and substituted eight years, comprising five years plus a three-year extension. All other orders remained in force.
2. The driving involved three cumulative category A features: a deliberate decision to overtake three vehicles in darkness without being able to judge whether the road was clear; an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre in which the speed of an oncoming vehicle could not properly be assessed; and speed of 76 to 88 miles per hour on a single-carriageway road subject to a 60 miles per hour limit. The offender’s usual character and the fact that the driving was uncharacteristic went to mitigation, not to the quality of his decision-making on the occasion. The case was therefore unequivocally category A, with a 12-year starting point and an eight-to-18-year range.
3. The deceased was a vulnerable road user and the offender had a passenger. Those were aggravating factors exerting upward pressure, but the court concluded that no upward adjustment was necessary. The driving itself provided no basis for a downward adjustment.
4. Personal mitigation could properly produce a reduction of up to three years from the 12-year starting point. That allowance reflected remorse, previous good character, youth, personal qualities, delay, the impact on future employment and the likely difficulties in prison arising from the offender’s mental health. After mitigation, the least sentence following a trial would have been about nine years. The guilty plea justified a one-third reduction, indicating a sentence of about six years.
5. The calculation was not mechanical. Standing back, six years was the proper and proportionate sentence and the least sentence reasonably reflecting both the seriousness of the offence and the substantial mitigation. The period of disqualification was adjusted in accordance with the principles outlined in Needham.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — On a reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, granted leave, found the sentence unduly lenient, quashed the custodial sentence and disqualification period, and substituted six years’ imprisonment and eight years’ disqualification: [2026] EWCA Crim 437.
• Crown Court at Sheffield — On 28 November 2025, imposed three years and six months’ imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving following a guilty plea at the first opportunity.