R v Lee Blake & Ors

An extended sentence is protective. A finding of dangerousness must be supported by adequate reasons addressing the risk of further specified offending and the necessity of an extended licence.

In an unusual case involving a vulnerable offender, inadequate reasons combined with the absence of a pre-sentence report or updated psychiatric evidence may invalidate the finding. On sentence appeals, the court must stand back and assess totality. An error affecting one component does not require intervention where the aggregate sentence remains just and proportionate and is not manifestly excessive.

On 31 March 2025, the Crown Court at Nottingham sentenced Lee Blake, Christopher Jones and Sophie Wootton for roles in a substantial enterprise involving cocaine, cannabis and firearms.

Blake received an extended determinate sentence of nine years, including six years' custody, and appealed against the finding that he was dangerous. Wootton received eight years, including consecutive sentences for cannabis supply and firearms offences, and appealed on the basis that insufficient credit had been given for mitigation. Jones received 25 years and renewed his application for permission to appeal, challenging the categorisation of his role and the application of totality.

The central issues were whether Blake's dangerousness finding was adequately reasoned and supported by evidence, whether Wootton's sentence was excessive despite any error in calculating the drugs sentence, and whether Jones's sentence involved an arguable error of principle.

The court allowed Blake's appeal, dismissed Wootton's appeal and refused Jones's renewed application for permission to appeal.

1. Blake. The purpose of an extended sentence was to protect the public from the risk of further specified offending. The sentencing judge gave no reasons for finding Blake dangerous. There was no pre-sentence report and no updated psychiatric evidence, despite evidence of schizophrenia, vulnerability to exploitation and changes in his supervision and treatment. In those unusual circumstances, the judge lacked a complete picture of Blake's vulnerabilities and how future risk could be managed. The finding of dangerousness was therefore erroneous.
2. The court overturned the finding and substituted a determinate sentence of six years' imprisonment, being the custodial term already imposed. It was unusual for the court to disturb a trial judge's finding of dangerousness, but the inadequate reasoning and evidential deficiencies justified intervention.
3. Wootton. The judge should have explained more clearly how he calculated the notional sentence of four years for the cannabis offence. Treating the guideline starting point as both the starting point and the end point before applying guilty-plea credit could be characterised as an error in principle. However, the court had to assess the totality of the sentence. It was highly likely that any reduction in the drugs sentence would have been offset by a longer sentence for the serious firearms offending. The aggregate sentence of eight years was not manifestly excessive, and consecutive sentences were permissible.
4. Jones. The trial judge was best placed to evaluate Jones's role because he had presided over the trial. He had given clear and cogent reasons for finding a leading role in both the cannabis and cocaine offending. The appellate court could not interfere with that evaluation. The judge was entitled to select the cocaine count as the lead count and elevate its tariff to reflect the overall drugs criminality, including the substantial cannabis enterprise. The consecutive firearms sentence and the resulting 25-year sentence were just and proportionate.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 452, Blake's appeal was allowed, Wootton's appeal was dismissed and Jones's renewed application for permission to appeal was refused.
2. Crown Court at Nottingham: On 31 March 2025, HHJ Michael Auty KC sentenced Blake, Jones and Wootton for drug-supply and firearms offending.