R v Ali Samadi Rasul

When sentencing novel fraud offending under the relevant Sentencing Council guideline, the listed examples of greater harm do not exhaust the assessment. The court may consider the nature of the harm, deliberate use of a false identity and the wider impact on the community. Evidence of prevalence is not required merely to assess community impact.

Overall criminality may be reflected through a lead offence and concurrent sentences without impermissible double counting where harm categorisation and deterrence perform distinct functions. Strong personal mitigation may reduce the term, but deterrence may justify immediate custody and refusal to suspend it.

The appellant pleaded guilty to four offences under sections 6 and 7 of the Fraud Act 2006, arising from attempts to cheat in driving theory tests and the use of an impersonator to obtain a pass in his name. On 14 November 2025, HHJ Evans at the Crown Court at Exeter imposed two years' immediate custody, with shorter concurrent terms on the other counts.

He appealed by leave against sentence. The issues included the application of the fraud guideline's culpability and harm categories, whether the judge had double counted the social harm, the treatment of the offending overall, the weight given to personal mitigation, and whether the custodial sentence should have been suspended.

1. Appeal allowed to a limited extent. The sentence on the lead count was reduced to 20 months, following a notional sentence after trial of 30 months and full credit for the guilty plea. The sentence on count 3 was reduced to 18 months and those on counts 1 and 2 to 12 months each, all concurrent. The refusal to suspend the sentence was upheld.
2. The sentencing judge was entitled to place the offending in the greater-harm category. The guideline was of general application and did not directly address every factual form of fraud involving driving tests. The judge could assess the nature of the harm, including the wider social impact on the safe licensing system and road users. Deliberate use of a false identity could support greater harm by analogy with third-party identity offending. Evidence of prevalence was not required to establish impact on the community at large.
3. The culpability assessment was also sustainable. A distinction could be drawn between a professional criminal and an unsophisticated individual, and there was no reason to quarrel with the classification of culpability B. The earlier decision in R v Mbangi [2013] EWCA Crim 1419 was not a relevant factual comparator under the definitive guidelines, although the culpability distinction was useful.
4. The judge was entitled to take count 4 as the lead offence and reflect the overall criminality by treating features of the other offences as aggravating factors, while imposing shorter concurrent sentences to achieve totality. The same social harm was not impermissibly double counted: it was used first to assess harm and later to determine whether deterrence required immediate custody.
5. Insufficient weight had been given to the appellant's substantial personal mitigation, including his youth, immaturity, good character, remorse, low risk of reoffending, rehabilitation steps and the likely difficulty of a first custodial experience. Those factors counterbalanced the aggravating features and justified reducing the term. Nevertheless, the decision not to suspend custody was unimpeachable because the need for deterrent punishment remained sufficient.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2026] EWCA Crim 453, the appeal was allowed to a limited extent. The custodial terms were reduced and made concurrent as ordered, but the refusal to suspend the sentence was upheld.
2. Crown Court at Exeter — On 14 November 2025, HHJ Evans sentenced the appellant to two years' immediate custody for four offences under sections 6 and 7 of the Fraud Act 2006.