R v Vincent Joseph Morgan

For a no-case-to-answer submission based on circumstantial evidence, the question is whether a reasonable jury, viewing the prosecution case at its highest, could properly draw the adverse inference on one possible view of the evidence. It is not necessary that every reasonable jury would do so. Direct evidence capable of supporting the essential act, together with circumstantial evidence such as conduct, medical findings and inconsistent accounts, is for the jury to evaluate. Bad-character evidence does not make a case impermissible where the prosecution case is independently strong. On sentencing, the trial judge’s assessment of the uplift from the statutory starting point attracts particular weight. The Court of Appeal will not interfere where the uplift is neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Leeds of murder and two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm arising from violence towards Lisa Welford. He received a life sentence with a minimum term of 21 years, less time spent on remand. After a single judge refused permission to appeal, he renewed applications against conviction and sentence.

The conviction application concerned the refusal of a submission of no case to answer. The applicant argued that the evidence did not establish how Lisa Welford entered the river and that the prosecution case depended impermissibly on bad-character evidence. The sentencing application challenged the findings concerning aggravating factors, double counting and mitigation. The central issues were whether a properly directed jury could infer murder from the evidence taken at its highest and whether the minimum term was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

Applications refused. The renewed applications for permission to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused.

1. No case to answer. The court applied the classic test identified in Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060, as refined in the subsequent circumstantial-evidence authorities. The question was whether a reasonable jury, rather than every reasonable jury, could on one possible view of the prosecution evidence draw the adverse inference. The evidence had to be considered at its highest.
2. Conviction. There was direct evidence from Robert Scaife that the applicant was holding Lisa Welford with her head submerged. Whether that evidence was exculpatory, and the questions of intention and timing, were matters for the jury. The judge had no proper basis for withdrawing the case.
3. Even without that direct evidence, the jury could infer guilt from the combined circumstances, including the applicant’s conduct in the water, his initial wish to prevent the police being called, the femur fracture, the extent of the injuries and his changing accounts. The bad-character evidence did not impermissibly support a weak case. The factual case was independently strong and consistent with the evidence of previous violence.
4. Sentence. The judge correctly used the 15-year starting point under paragraph 5 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The precise uplift was primarily a matter for the trial judge, who had seen the evidence and was familiar with the applicant. The increase to 21 years was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.
5. The court additionally observed that there was no double counting: the convictions on counts 2 and 3 and the applicant’s previous similar offending were separate aggravating features. Lack of premeditation was neutral, and the applicant’s knowledge that alcohol made him violent substantially weakened reliance on intoxication as mitigation.

• Crown Court at Leeds. The applicant was convicted of murder and two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 21-year minimum term, less time spent on remand.
• Single judge. Applications for permission to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The renewed applications were refused in [2026] EWCA Crim 472.