R v Magesh Vencatachellun

In sentencing for breach of a restraining order, the absence of threats, insults or admitted fear does not prevent a court from inferring harm or distress exceeding the guideline’s lowest category where the evidence supports that conclusion. The court may consider the subject matter of the contact, the sensitivity of the dispute, the background to the order and the persistence and timing of the breaches. Sentencing categories are not watertight compartments; overlapping ranges allow the judge to reflect the circumstances of the offending. An appellate court will not interfere merely because a sentence appears severe if there was no error of principle and the sentence is not manifestly excessive. Any mitigation reduction should precede credit for a guilty plea, although an incorrect sequence may be immaterial where it makes no difference to the result.

The appellant pleaded guilty to breaching a restraining order by making 70 telephone calls to the protected person over nearly nine months. The order had prohibited direct or indirect contact and had been made after convictions for criminal damage and threatening or abusive behaviour against her. The appellant’s basis of plea stated that the calls mainly concerned shared bills and the flat, denied threatening or insulting language, and denied that the victim was fearful. The Crown Court sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment, categorising the offence as harm category 2A and applying reductions for the guilty plea and mitigation. The appellant appealed against sentence, arguing that the offence belonged in category 3A because of his basis of plea.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentencing judge was entitled to place the offence in harm category 2A rather than category 3A. The guideline’s categories were not watertight compartments, and its sentencing ranges substantially overlapped. That structure accommodated the wide range of circumstances requiring judicial assessment.
2. The appellant’s denials did not prevent the judge from inferring harm or distress exceeding the lowest category from the evidence properly before the court. The accepted subject matter of the calls was the flat, which the victim had purchased as her home. There had been continuing tension because the appellant maintained that he was entitled to remain there after the relationship had ended. The calls therefore concerned a sensitive subject.
3. The background to the restraining order was also relevant. It included the appellant’s recent criminal damage to the victim’s car and abusive behaviour intended to cause her fear. The calls began barely a month after the order was made and continued persistently for nearly nine months. Taken together, those matters provided adequate material for the inference that the victim suffered more than little harm or distress.
4. Even if the sentence could be regarded as severe, it was not wrong in principle through miscategorisation and was not manifestly excessive.
5. The court noted that the guideline required mitigation to be taken into account before credit for a guilty plea. The judge had reversed that sequence, but the error did not affect the sentence in this case because the adjustments were relatively small.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 478, the appeal against sentence was dismissed. The court upheld the 20-month sentence imposed after categorisation in harm category 2A.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook: On 9 January 2026, Mr Recorder Jeremy Dein KC sentenced the appellant to 20 months’ imprisonment for breaching a restraining order contrary to section 363 of the Sentencing Act 2020.