R v LEJ

On a prosecution appeal against a no-case ruling, the statutory threshold is high, but it is met where the ruling is wrong in law, involves an error of law or principle, or was unreasonable. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 preserves the jury’s role. A judge must leave the case where the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, could permit a properly directed jury to convict. Internal inconsistencies, conflicting accounts of peripheral matters and questions about witness reliability are ordinarily for the jury unless the evidence is transparently incapable of supporting a conviction. A judge must not rely at that stage on hearsay evidence from a prospective defence witness which has not been adduced and is disputed. The appeal was allowed and a fresh trial ordered.

The prosecution sought leave to appeal under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 after the Crown Court at Shrewsbury upheld a submission of no case to answer in a sexual-offence prosecution involving a schoolteacher and a 12-year-old pupil. The prosecution alleged that the teacher touched the complainant’s thigh during a music lesson. The defence relied on inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts and surrounding evidence. The Court of Appeal considered whether the evidence was so unreliable that no properly directed jury could convict, whether the trial judge had relied on inadmissible or unadduced material, and whether it was in the interests of justice to grant leave and order a retrial. The transcript was anonymised under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.

1. Leave and threshold. The court granted permission to appeal. Under section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the prosecution faced a high hurdle. The ruling could be reversed because it was wrong in law, involved an error of law or principle, or was not reasonable for the judge to make.
2. No-case test. Applying R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, the court held that a case should be stopped only where there is no evidence of the offence or, taking the prosecution evidence at its highest, no properly directed jury could properly convict. Where the strength of the evidence depends on reliability or other matters within the jury’s province, the case must proceed if one possible view would support a conviction.
3. Application to the evidence. The inconsistencies concerning the timing of the complainant’s visit to the toilet, the movement of the teacher’s hand, the post-incident joke and the staple and x-ray evidence could be assessed differently by reasonable juries. They did not make it impossible for a jury to accept the essential account that the complainant’s thigh had been touched under the desk and that the touching was sexual.
4. Unadduced evidence. The judge also erred in law by relying on evidence attributed to a prospective defence witness. It was then hearsay from email exchanges, had not been adduced, and was denied by the complainant. Its credibility and weight were matters for the jury.
5. Interests of justice and order. The court applied the discretion recognised in R v Al-Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 2186; [2009] 1 WLR 1661. The competing points could fairly be assessed at a new trial. The appeal was therefore allowed and, under section 61(4), a fresh trial was ordered.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): in [2026] EWCA Crim 49, permission to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed and a fresh trial was ordered.
2. Crown Court at Shrewsbury: His Honour Judge Mathews upheld the submission of no case to answer on 17 December 2025.

Addendum: The transcript records that LEJ was retried and acquitted.