R v Anthony Jesus Sousa

A conviction is not rendered unsafe merely because a trial judge intervenes during cross-examination. The relevant question is whether the intervention caused the recognised forms of unfairness: inviting the jury to disbelieve the defence in terms that a standard direction could not cure, making it impossible for defence counsel to conduct the defence, or preventing the defendant or a defence witness from giving their account. Judicial interventions are permissible to maintain proper questioning and require allegations to be put fairly. The trial must be assessed overall, including whether counsel could still advance the defence and whether the jury was left to evaluate the evidence. Where no unfairness or impropriety is shown and the conviction remains safe, the appeal should be dismissed.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook on 23 June 2025 of perverting the course of public justice. He was sentenced on 8 August 2025 to a suspended sentence order. He appealed against conviction, with leave limited to alleged improper intervention by the trial judge during the cross-examination of the prosecution case officer.

The appellant also sought to renew applications concerning the meaning of tendency and a Lucas direction, but those applications were not pursued. The central issue was whether the judge’s interventions, and related comments in the summing-up, created unfairness or rendered the conviction unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court concluded that the conviction was safe and that the conduct of the trial involved no unfairness or impropriety.
2. The applicable principles were those identified in R v Hulusi and Purvis (1974) 58 Cr App R 378. An intervention may justify quashing a conviction where the judge has invited the jury to disbelieve the defence in terms that cannot be cured by the usual direction, made it impossible for defence counsel to conduct the defence, or effectively prevented the defendant or a defence witness from giving their account. The third category did not arise because the defence called no evidence.
3. The judge was entitled to regulate the form and pace of cross-examination. Requiring counsel to ask questions rather than make comments, and requiring an allegation concerning the witness’s honesty to be put fairly and squarely, was not improper. Counsel was able to rephrase questions and pursue the points relied upon. The interventions, viewed overall, were directed to proper cross-examination and were not pejorative.
4. The court rejected criticisms concerning the jury bundle and summing-up. The judge’s comments about duplicated and less accurate translations were based on the evidence and did not amount to a direction that the jury must disregard material. Subsequent corrections were clear and did not create contradictory directions or demonstrate bias.
5. The transcript, the agreed facts, the CCTV, messages, interview evidence and the appellant’s failure to give evidence provided ample material from which guilt could properly be inferred. The appeal against conviction was therefore dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — On 21 April 2026, the appeal against conviction was dismissed. The court held that the conviction was safe: [2026] EWCA Crim 585.
2. Crown Court at Snaresbrook — Before HHJ Cohen, the appellant was convicted on 23 June 2025 and sentenced on 8 August 2025 to a suspended sentence order of 20 months’ imprisonment, with ancillary requirements.