Mark Twigg & Anor v R

Under section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, liability is strict, but the prosecution must prove a causal connection between the defendant’s act or omission and the dog becoming dangerously out of control. A person may remain for the time being in charge despite being absent, and more than one person may be in charge simultaneously. Whether charge continues is a question of fact and degree for the jury. Absence and another person’s presence do not alone justify a no-case submission. For sentencing, a Category B offence with multiple medium-culpability factors may justify an adjustment towards the top of the guideline range before mitigation is applied.

Mark Twigg and Joanne Bedford were convicted at the Crown Court at Manchester of being in charge of dogs which caused injury while dangerously out of control, contrary to section 3(1) and (4) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. They had been acquitted of manslaughter. Twigg sought leave to appeal against conviction, arguing that he ceased to be in charge when he left the farm and that Bedford’s presence excluded simultaneous liability. Bedford sought leave to appeal against her sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment, arguing that the sentence was excessive and should have been suspended. The central issues were the meaning of being for the time being in charge, the adequacy of the jury directions, and the proportionality of Bedford’s sentence.

The court refused both applications for leave to appeal.

1. Statutory liability. Section 3(1) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 creates a strict-liability offence. The prosecution must nevertheless prove some causal connection between the defendant’s act or omission and the dog becoming dangerously out of control. The act or omission must to some more-than-minimal degree cause or permit that prohibited state of affairs. The statutory definition in section 10(3) concerns reasonable apprehension that the dog will injure a person or assistance dog.
2. Meaning of being in charge. The authorities, including R v Rawlings [1994] Crim LR 433 and L v CPS [2010] EWCA 341 (Admin), establish that the question is one of fact and degree. Ownership and physical presence are unnecessary. More than one person may be in charge at the same time. Transfer of physical control does not automatically terminate charge. DPP v Watkins [1989] 89 Cr App R 112, concerning motor vehicles, did not require a different conclusion.
3. First applicant. There was sufficient evidence that Twigg retained responsibility for the security of the dogs, knew that Daniel could gain access to the pen, and had done or omitted something which to some extent caused or permitted the dogs to be dangerously out of control. The judge was entitled to leave to the jury whether Bedford alone, or both applicants, were in charge. The directions were correct. Leave to appeal against conviction was refused.
4. Sentence. The judge was entitled to treat the offence as Category B, with a four-year starting point and a two-to-seven-year range. The multiple medium-culpability factors justified an adjustment at or near the top of the range before mitigation. The substantial mitigation, including the loss of the applicant’s son and her responsibility for her surviving children, was adequately reflected in the reduction to three and a half years. The sentence was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.

• Crown Court at Manchester: On 27 July 2025, both applicants were convicted of the dangerous-dogs offence and acquitted of manslaughter. On 10 October 2025, Twigg was sentenced to two years and eight months’ imprisonment and Bedford to three years and six months’ imprisonment.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 587, the Full Court refused Twigg leave to appeal against conviction and Bedford leave to appeal against sentence.