R v Rhys Billy Hedges

For non-defendant bad character evidence under Criminal Justice Act 2003, admissibility requires substantial probative value in relation to a matter in issue and substantial importance in the case as a whole. An appellate court should respect a fact-sensitive trial decision unless it is plainly wrong or Wednesbury unreasonable. Jury directions on self-defence must be read as a whole. Aggression or voluntary participation in a knife fight does not automatically exclude self-defence where the jury must still decide whether the defendant genuinely believed that he was under attack and whether the force was reasonable. A manslaughter conviction may remain safe without an express direction on intent to cause some harm where the evidence makes that conclusion unavoidable. Sentencing a child must remain individualised and youth-focused. An unavailable statutory sentence may be quashed and replaced with the correct form.

The appellant, aged 17 at conviction, pleaded guilty to possessing a bladed article but was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his cousin during a knife fight. The Crown Court at Lewes sentenced him to eight years’ detention in a young offender institution.

He appealed against conviction on grounds concerning the directions on self-defence and the mental element of unlawful act manslaughter. He also sought an extension of time to renew refused grounds concerning bad character evidence and recorded prison telephone calls, and renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence. The central issues were whether the conviction was unsafe, whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or based on an erroneous approach to youth sentencing, and whether the sentence had been expressed under the correct statutory power.

The court refused the extension of time and renewed applications for leave, dismissed the appeal against conviction, and refused leave to appeal against sentence. It nevertheless corrected the statutory form of the sentence.

1. Bad character evidence. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003 section 100(1)(b), the evidence had to have substantial probative value on a matter in issue and substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole. Following R v Al-Shumari [2025] EWCA Crim 1317, a fact-sensitive trial decision applying the correct principles would not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or Wednesbury unreasonable. The judge was entitled to exclude general assertions about the deceased’s family while admitting evidence concerning the deceased and matters known to the appellant.
2. Recorded prison calls. The judge was entitled to find that the recording system complied with the relevant legislative framework and that the appellant had consented to monitoring, consistently with R v Mahmood [2013] EWCA Crim 2356. Late service caused no injustice, no further disclosure application was made under Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 section 8, and the material’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
3. Self-defence. The defence required the jury to consider whether force was needed and, if so, whether the amount used was reasonable in the circumstances as the appellant believed them to be. Read as a whole, the directions left aggression, voluntary participation and genuine belief in attack as factual questions for the jury. The reference to a consensual knife fight did not create a legal bar to self-defence, and the route to verdict was compatible with the written directions.
4. Manslaughter. Although there was no separate direction requiring proof of an intention to cause at least some harm, no reasonable jury could have failed to find that intention given the knife and the force used. The appellant’s evidence had addressed his intention, and describing the blow as instinctive added nothing once self-defence had been rejected.
5. Sentence. The judge adopted an individualised approach to the appellant as a young offender and did not sentence him as a mini-adult, consistent with R v ZA [2023] EWCA Crim 596. The eight-year term was not manifestly excessive. Because section 262 of the Sentencing Act 2020 did not authorise the sentence for a defendant aged 17 at conviction, the sentence was quashed and substituted with detention under section 250, less 263 days spent on remand.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2026] EWCA Crim 607: refused the extension of time and renewed applications for leave, dismissed the conviction appeal, refused leave to appeal against sentence, and corrected the statutory form of detention.
• Crown Court at Lewes: acquitted the appellant of murder, convicted him of manslaughter, and sentenced him to eight years’ detention in a young offender institution, less 263 days on remand.