R v Kylam Bristow

In deciding whether to suspend a custodial sentence, the presence of factors favouring suspension does not make suspension inevitable. The sentencing judge must consider whether the seriousness of the offence means that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody. The weight given to guideline factors is a matter for the judge’s discretion. An appellate court should intervene only for an error of principle or where the conclusion was not open to the judge. A sentence may be uplifted within the applicable category range to reflect exceptionally serious offending, provided the same aggravating feature is not counted twice. A later change in the law governing suspended sentences is assessed against the legal framework applicable when the sentence was imposed.

After pleading guilty at Derby Magistrates’ Court to dangerous driving and driving without third-party insurance, contrary respectively to section 2 and section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, the appellant was sentenced by the Crown Court at Derby to eight months’ imprisonment and disqualified from driving for two years and four months. The dangerous driving involved a prolonged police pursuit, very high speeds, repeated red-light offences and serious risks to other road users.

The appellant appealed against sentence with leave. He challenged the extent of the uplift from the sentencing-guideline starting point and argued that the sentence should have been suspended. The central issues were whether the sentence involved double counting or inadequate allowance for mitigation, and whether the sentencing judge had erred in concluding that only immediate custody could properly mark the seriousness of the offending.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. Sentence and uplift. The offending was an extremely dangerous and protracted example of category A2 dangerous driving. The limited injury and property damage resulted from luck rather than from a low level of risk. The uplift from the 36-week starting point to 15 months kept the sentence within the category range and placed it in the upper part of that range, where it belonged. There was no double counting. Evading the police was an aggravating feature with wider relevance than the separate offence of driving without insurance, reflecting the appellant’s sustained refusal to stop.
2. Mitigation and guilty plea. The sentencing judge clearly reduced the sentence from 15 months to 12 months to reflect personal mitigation, including remorse and good character, before applying full credit for the guilty plea. That was an appropriate approach.
3. Suspension. The decision whether to impose a suspended sentence order is discretionary. The imposition guidelines identify factors supporting suspension, but their presence does not make suspension inevitable. The judge had considered the relevant factors, including rehabilitation prospects and the appellant’s personal circumstances, but was entitled to conclude that the seriousness of the driving meant that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody. The weight given to the competing factors was for the sentencing judge, and no error of principle was shown.
4. Subsequent developments. The appeal had to be assessed against the law applicable when sentence was imposed. A later change in the law governing suspended sentences did not justify substituting a suspended sentence. The current condition of the prison system carried no significant weight in the circumstances.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): By [2026] EWCA Crim 633, the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
• Crown Court at Derby: On 18 March 2026, the appellant was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment for dangerous driving and disqualified from driving for two years and four months.
• Derby Magistrates’ Court: On 3 November 2025, the appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and driving without third-party insurance.