R v Hamid Ali

A written charge validly starts criminal proceedings where it describes the alleged offence in ordinary language, identifies the legislation creating it, and gives particulars sufficiently clear to show the allegation against the defendant. A conspiracy charge need not specify the precise species of conspiracy or the exact substantive provision pursued at that stage. Where an adult is charged with an indictable-only conspiracy, the magistrates’ court must send the case to the Crown Court. That sending confers jurisdiction, and imprecision in repeated wording does not invalidate a clear sending decision.

Following a trial at the Crown Court at Liverpool, the appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cannabis and was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment. The postal requisition described a conspiracy to fraudulently evade duty on cannabis and cited section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. The magistrates’ court sent the case to the Crown Court under section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The indictment alleged a conspiracy to import Class B drugs with intent to evade a prohibition or restriction. The appeal concerned whether the requisition and subsequent sending were legally valid, particularly where section 170(2)(b) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 was not expressly identified.

Appeal dismissed. The Crown Court had jurisdiction to try the appellant.

1. Validity of the written charge. Section 29 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and rule 7.3 of the Criminal Procedure Rules impose a simple and relatively low threshold for commencing proceedings. The written charge must describe the offence in ordinary language, identify the legislation creating it, and give particulars making the alleged conduct clear. The requisition sufficiently informed the appellant that he was charged with conspiring with others to import a large quantity of cannabis illegally. Identifying section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 was sufficient. It was unnecessary to specify the precise species of conspiracy or the detailed legal basis of the substantive offence. (Paras [15]–[18].)
2. Nature of the alleged offence. Section 170(2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 provides several alternative forms of unlawful conduct concerning goods. The description of evading duty in relation to cannabis was not legally impossible because duty may be chargeable on cannabis licensed for pharmaceutical use. This subsidiary point reinforced the validity of the requisition. (Paras [19]–[21].)
3. Sending to the Crown Court. Applying the approach identified in R v Butt [2024] 1 WLR 5361, the relevant question was the statutory power being exercised. Under section 51(1) and (2)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, an adult charged with an indictable-only offence must be sent forthwith to the Crown Court. A conspiracy charge was indictable only, so the magistrates’ court had no discretion. The sending was the act which conferred Crown Court jurisdiction. (Paras [12]–[14], [22] and [25].)
4. The bold wording in the court extract clearly identified a conspiracy to evade a prohibition, restriction or other provision. Repeated wording which was closer to an allegation under section 170(2)(a) did not alter the validity of the sending. The case could be sent under one offence created by section 170(2) and the defendant ultimately charged under another. (Para [23].)
5. The court also endorsed the approach in R (on the application of John Preston Bentham) v Governor of HMP Wandsworth [2006] EWHC 121 (Admin), that the substantive decision is made under section 51(1) and that the accompanying notice is administrative. A defect in the notice would not invalidate the sending. (Para [24].)

The Crown Court was therefore properly seized of jurisdiction, and the appeal against conviction was dismissed. (Para [26]–[27].)

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 634, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction and held that the Crown Court had jurisdiction.
2. Crown Court at Liverpool: Following trial before Her Honour Judge Crangle and a jury, the appellant was convicted on 4 November 2024 and sentenced on 21 March 2025 to five years and six months’ imprisonment.