R v Tejean Kennedy

Dangerousness is assessed personally by reference to the offender’s conduct, background and the risk at release. The fact that other defendants did not meet the statutory threshold does not determine the assessment for the offender before the court. Serious organisation, criminal sophistication, planning, concealment of identity, association with serious organised criminality and willingness to engage in high-risk offending may all be relevant to future risk. The court may assess dangerousness even where the offender was not convicted of inflicting or intending the fatal injuries, provided it does not equate participation in the wider offending with responsibility for those injuries. An appellate court will rarely interfere with a sentencing judge’s assessment of dangerousness where the judge conducted the trial and heard the evidence.

The applicant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of false imprisonment and manslaughter, and received an extended sentence of 20 years comprising 18 years’ custody and a two-year extension period. He renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence.

The alleged disparity ground was withdrawn. The remaining issue was whether the sentencing judge had wrongly concluded under section 308 of the Sentencing Code that the applicant posed a significant risk of serious harm from further specified offences. The applicant relied on his limited violent antecedents, his acquittal of murder and his age at release. The central question was whether the evidence of his role, planning, concealment, criminal associations and participation in the offending supported the dangerousness finding.

1. Application refused. The sentencing judge’s conclusion that the applicant satisfied the statutory dangerousness criteria was plainly open to her on the evidence. The 18-year custodial term was not argued to be manifestly excessive, and the extended sentence involved no misdirection, misapplication of principle or reliance on irrelevant matters.
2. Dangerousness is a personal assessment. The fact that other defendants did not meet the threshold did not affect the assessment of this applicant, whose conduct and background differed materially. The judge was entitled to consider his drugs supply, embedded connection with criminality, concealment of identity, use of a temporary handset, direct involvement in the abduction, prolonged unlawful imprisonment and participation in a carefully organised operation.
3. The court held that organisational capability, criminal sophistication and willingness to engage in high-risk offending were relevant to future risk. The judge did not treat the applicant as responsible for inflicting the fatal injuries. She treated his own role and conduct as indicating a propensity to engage in serious organised violence, which was a legitimate factor in assessing dangerousness.
4. The judge was entitled to conclude that the risk would remain at release. The applicant’s age did not preclude future dangerousness where the offending reflected entrenched criminal behaviour and association with organised groups. The factors identified in R v Lang [2006] 2 Cr App R Cr App R(S) 3, including the nature and circumstances of the offences, antecedents, association with high-risk criminal activity, organised offending, and planning and preparation, had been addressed.
5. Following R v Howlett [2019] EWCA Crim 1224, it would be rare for an appellate court which had not conducted the trial or seen the offender to overturn a sentencing judge’s discretionary assessment of dangerousness. The renewed application for leave was therefore refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal against sentence after refusal by a single judge. The Court refused the renewed application: [2026] EWCA Crim 65.
2. Central Criminal Court — The applicant was convicted on 30 November 2023 and sentenced on 12 December 2023 by HHJ Whitehouse to an extended sentence of 20 years for manslaughter, with concurrent sentences for kidnapping and false imprisonment.