R v Bradley Christie

When sentencing an adult for historic offences committed while under 18, the court must assess the offender by reference to the age at which the offending occurred. It must apply the statutory and guideline framework for child offenders, unless the rare statutory exception applies. The passage of time does not increase culpability or justify treating the offender as an adult offender at the time of offending. The court must consider the applicable maximum sentence and sentencing options, together with harm, culpability, mitigation, delay and present circumstances. A sentence may remain severe where persistent offending caused grave and enduring harm, provided the judge applied the child-sentencing principles carefully and took all mitigation into account.

The applicant was convicted in the Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne of historic sexual offences committed against a younger boy while the applicant was himself aged between 10 or 11 and 17. He received an aggregate sentence of six and a half years’ imprisonment.

He renewed an application for leave to appeal against sentence after the single judge refused leave. He argued that the starting point was too high and that the sentence failed to reflect the principles in R v Ahmed and Others [2023] EWCA Crim 281, mitigation and future risk. The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had properly applied the child-offender framework to historic offending sentenced in adulthood.

1. Renewed application refused. The sentence of six and a half years’ imprisonment was severe for offending committed at age 17, but it was not arguably excessive.
2. Under R v Ahmed and Others [2023] EWCA Crim 281, sentencing an adult for offences committed as a child requires the court to consider the sentence that would have been imposed on a child of the offender’s age when the offences were committed. That includes the applicable maximum and the forms of sentence then available.
3. The court must follow the Children guideline under section 59(1) of the Sentencing Code, save in the rare case where doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. The obligation continues despite any lengthy interval between offending and sentence. The passage of time does not increase culpability or remove the distinction between child and adult offending.
4. The sentencing judge had carefully applied those principles, the relevant Sentencing Council guidance and age-related reductions. She had also taken account of the applicant’s mitigation, including his lack of subsequent offending, family responsibilities, low assessed future risk, and the impact of conviction and sentence. The offending had been persistent over seven years and had caused serious, enduring psychological harm, with additional aggravating features.
5. The final sentence could not be criticised and was not arguably excessive. The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused.

• Crown Court at Newcastle upon Tyne: Following conviction on 13 November 2024, the applicant was sentenced on 30 January 2025 to six and a half years’ imprisonment.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The single judge refused leave. The renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence was refused under [2026] EWCA Crim 653.