R v Smita Bhayani

An extension of time to renew an application for leave to appeal against conviction should be refused where the proposed grounds disclose no realistic prospect that the conviction will be shown to be unsafe. The court need not address every peripheral or disjointed point individually where doing so would be neither necessary nor proportionate. The assessment may include direct evidence from participants, permissible inferences from contemporaneous statements, the testing of the prosecution case at trial, and the jury’s opportunity to assess the evidence. The fact that one witness did not see the collision itself does not undermine a conviction supported by other evidence. Good character and driving experience do not materially advance an application where an appropriate direction was given and the central evidential difficulty remains unanswered.

The applicant was convicted at Cambridge Crown Court, sitting at Peterborough, before His Honour Judge Enright and a jury, of causing serious injury by careless driving contrary to section 2C of the Road Traffic Act 1988. A single judge refused her application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against conviction. She sought to renew that application and relied on ineffective assistance, improper representations, insufficient evidence and defective jury instructions. She also sought permission to call fresh evidence, including documents and evidence from an unidentified person said to have spoken to her after the collision. The central issue was whether there was any realistic prospect of showing that the conviction was unsafe.

Disposition

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) refused the application for an extension of time. It agreed with the single judge that there was no realistic prospect of the conviction being shown to be unsafe, and that granting further time would achieve nothing.

1. Peripheral grounds. The applicant’s points were unfocused and disjointed. It was neither necessary nor proportionate for the single judge, or the full court, to explain separately why every peripheral detail failed to advance the proposed appeal.
2. Evidence at trial. The applicant had been properly represented and the prosecution evidence had been tested. In particular, it had been put to Mr Stephens that he was travelling too fast. The jury were entitled to assess his evidence, together with Mr Cook’s direct evidence, the vehicle movements and the applicant’s contemporaneous comments at the scene.
3. Absence of a witness to the collision. The submission that there were no witnesses to the events overlooked the direct evidence of Mr Stephens and Mr Cook. It also overlooked the inferences which the jury were entitled to draw from the applicant’s statements after the collision. Mr Cooper’s failure to see the collision itself did not alter that evidential position.
4. Other matters. The judge gave an appropriate good character direction. The applicant’s driving experience, motorbike licence and further criticisms did not answer the central contrast between the prosecution evidence and the absence of a coherent contrary account in her trial evidence. The additional documents and proposed fresh evidence did not change the assessment.

The single judge’s assessment remained persuasive. The application was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The full court refused the application for an extension of time, holding that there was no realistic prospect of showing that the conviction was unsafe: [2026] EWCA Crim 691.
• Single judge of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Refused the applicant’s application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Cambridge, sitting at Peterborough: On 4 January 2024, the applicant was convicted before His Honour Judge Enright and a jury of causing serious injury by careless driving.