R v Aaron Akram

In an Attorney General’s Reference, a sentence is unduly lenient only where it falls outside the range that a judge, applying all relevant factors, could reasonably regard as appropriate. The Court of Appeal must respect the trial judge’s advantage in assessing competing considerations, but must correct a substantial departure from ordinary sentencing norms. In cases of serious rape, positive good character will ordinarily provide no mitigation. A victim’s wish that the offender be stopped rather than imprisoned does not reduce culpability. Where separate offences are proved, totality remains relevant, but the sentence for the lead offence must receive a substantial uplift to reflect additional offending. Domestic abuse, exploitation of trust arising from a former relationship, offending in the victim’s home, non-consensual ejaculation and the presence of a child may materially aggravate sentence.

The offender was convicted after trial of two rapes and one assault by penetration against his former partner. The offences occurred in the context of a controlling and abusive former relationship, including an incident at the victim’s home while the offender was expected to care for their child. His Honour Judge Lowe imposed concurrent sentences of four years’ imprisonment on the rape counts and two years on the assault count.

The Attorney General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that it was unduly lenient. The central issues were the weight of the aggravating features, the effect of the offender’s clean record and positive character, the victim’s stated reporting motive, and whether the sentence sufficiently reflected the separate earlier rape.

1. Reference granted; sentences increased. The Court quashed the sentences of four years on counts 1 and 2 and substituted concurrent sentences of 6½ years on each rape count. The sentence on count 3 remained undisturbed. The victim surcharge was corrected to £190, with the other ancillary orders unchanged.
2. A sentence is unduly lenient when it falls outside the range of sentences which a judge, applying all relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate. Sentencing is an art rather than a science. The trial judge is particularly well placed to assess the offender, the victim and the weight of competing considerations. The Attorney General’s Reference jurisdiction addresses gross error, substantial departure from ordinary sentencing norms and the preservation of public confidence; it does not condemn justified leniency.
3. The aggravating features of the lead rape had real weight. They included rape within a controlling domestic-abuse relationship, the victim’s loss of the security of her own home, the offender’s exploitation of the trust and access created by the former relationship and parenting arrangements, ejaculation despite an express objection, and the practical effect of the child’s presence upstairs. The court distinguished the guideline category factor of abuse of trust from the wider exploitation of trust in the circumstances.
4. The offender’s clean record afforded the only real mitigation. Positive good character could not normally mitigate an offence of this seriousness. The victim’s wish to stop the offending rather than secure imprisonment did not reduce its seriousness or the offender’s culpability.
5. The lead-offence sentence required a substantial uplift for the earlier, separate rape, which had many of the same aggravating features and involved taking advantage of contact arrangements. Totality had to be respected, but concurrent sentences did not justify failing to reflect the additional offending. Viewed overall, 6½ years was the least sentence commensurate with all three offences.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2026] EWCA Crim 732: granted the Attorney General’s Reference, quashed the sentences on counts 1 and 2, substituted concurrent terms of 6½ years, left count 3 undisturbed and amended the victim surcharge.
• Crown Court at Gloucester — His Honour Judge Lowe imposed concurrent sentences of four years on counts 1 and 2 and two years on count 3.