R v Brandon James

For sentencing a sexual offence, whether there was a significant degree of planning requires judgment on all the facts. The indicators of heightened culpability may assist, but planning inherent in sexual offending does not automatically meet the threshold.

Joint arrangements by an offender and a child to enable the offender to live secretly in a third party’s home do not necessarily amount to significant planning where they were in a relationship and the arrangements were also driven by accommodation needs. The offence was therefore category 1B rather than 1A, and the sentence was reduced accordingly.

The appellant, aged 18 at the time, entered into a relationship with C, who was aged 14 or 15. They had consensual sexual intercourse while the appellant lived secretly at C’s grandmother’s house. The appellant was later convicted at the Crown Court at Bradford of one offence of sexual activity with a child, contrary to section 9(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and acquitted of other offences.

The sentencing judge placed the offence in harm category 1 and culpability category A because of significant planning, imposing three years and six months’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed sentence, arguing that the arrangements were principally orchestrated by C and did not justify category A culpability. The central issue was whether the arrangements amounted to a significant degree of planning.

The appeal was allowed. The sentence was quashed and replaced with one of 16 months’ imprisonment.

1. Planning and culpability. The difference between categories 1A and 1B made careful consideration of the planning threshold necessary. In R v Dogra [2019] EWCA Crim 145, the Court had explained that the words significant degree of planning required no further definition, that each case depended on its facts, and that other category A culpability matters could indicate the level of heightened culpability required. Planning inherent in sexual offending would not, without more, establish the threshold.
2. Application. The appellant and C regarded themselves as being in a relationship. The appellant had been made to leave his family home and needed somewhere to live. Their joint arrangements enabling him to live at C’s grandmother’s address without the householder’s knowledge and consent did not reach the required level of seriousness. The offence was therefore category 1B, with a 12-month starting point and a range extending to two years.
3. Sentence and procedure. Taking account of C’s age, the period of secret cohabitation, the appellant’s young age, previous good character, and delays between the offence, charge and conviction, the appropriate sentence was 16 months. A pre-sentence report should have been obtained under section 30(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020, but it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to obtain one given the outcome and likely immediate release.
4. Consequences of the variation. Because the sentence was below 30 months, the notification requirements under section 80 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 applied for 10 years from conviction rather than for life. The court also held that section 11(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 did not prevent it from correcting the omitted statutory surcharge. A surcharge of £187 was imposed under section 42 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 767, the sentence appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Bradford: On 9 October 2025, the appellant was convicted after trial of one offence of sexual activity with a child and sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment. He was acquitted of other offences.