Case details
Summary
In sentencing domestic abuse offences, the harm category must reflect the actual impact established by the evidence. Prolonged, graphic and repeated threats to kill may justify a sentence towards the top of the applicable range, even without physical violence or a visible weapon, particularly where they form part of serious coercive control and cause acute fear or distress. Separate offences may properly attract consecutive sentences where their context makes them sufficiently distinct, despite similarities between them. The totality principle requires a sufficient adjustment to ensure that the aggregate sentence remains proportionate. The Court of Appeal will not interfere merely because another sentencing structure was possible; intervention requires a sentence that is manifestly excessive.
Factual background
Following a four-day trial at the Crown Court at Chelmsford, the appellant was convicted of making a threat to kill and controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship. The offences involved prolonged domestic abuse and culminated in repeated threats to kill during a serious panic attack. The appellant received consecutive sentences of three years for the threat to kill and two years five months for controlling or coercive behaviour, producing a total sentence of five years five months after adjustment for totality.
He appealed against sentence, arguing that the harm category for the coercive-control offence was too high, that the threat-to-kill sentence involved double counting, and that consecutive sentences or the totality adjustment produced a manifestly excessive result. The central issues were the proper harm categorisation, the relationship between the offences, and the adequacy of the totality adjustment.
Held
- Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence of five years five months' imprisonment.
- The evidence, including the victim's personal statement, ABE interviews and trial evidence, established harm category 1 for both offences. The sentencing judge was entitled to assess the seriousness of the impact on the victim, having presided over the trial.
- The threat-to-kill offence was properly placed in category B1 with a two-year starting point. The increase to three years and three months before totality was justified by the severity of the offending, the multiple threats using different methods, the victim's serious panic attack and particular vulnerability, and the domestic-abuse context. The panic attack was not impermissibly double counted merely because it also evidenced very serious distress for categorisation purposes.
- The Court observed that the prolonged, graphic and repeated threats, made while the victim was effectively imprisoned in her home and against a background of serious coercive control, could have justified category A1. The absence of actual violence or a visible weapon did not prevent a high culpability assessment.
- The coercive-control offence fell squarely within category A1. The judge was entitled to impose consecutive sentences because the threat-to-kill offence was sufficiently distinct in context, having been made out of pure malice rather than as part of control generally. The six-month reduction adequately reflected the similarity between the offences and satisfied the totality principle.
- Another judge might have structured the sentence differently, but the aggregate sentence was not manifestly excessive. The judge could also have justified a similar overall tariff by treating the threat to kill as the lead offence and imposing a shorter concurrent sentence for coercive control.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 841, the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
- Crown Court at Chelmsford: Following conviction after trial, the appellant was sentenced to five years five months' imprisonment for making a threat to kill and controlling or coercive behaviour.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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