R v Corey Morgan

Where Sentencing Act 2020, section 277A applies to a sentence of no more than 12 months, the court must impose a suspended sentence order unless exceptional circumstances justify immediate custody. The sentencing judge must address that question and make the necessary finding before imposing immediate imprisonment. The seriousness of the offence alone is unlikely to be exceptional in such a case. It cannot be exceptional that the sentence should really have been longer. The statutory word exceptional requires circumstances that are uncommon. If the judge fails to apply the provision, the immediate sentence is unlawful and must be replaced by a suspended sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Newport Magistrates’ Court to dangerous driving and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence. The Crown Court imposed an immediate sentence of eight months’ imprisonment and disqualified him from driving for 22 months, including a four-month extension reflecting anticipated custody.

The conviction occurred after section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020, inserted by the Sentencing Act 2026, had come into force. The sentencing judge did not consider section 277A or decide whether exceptional circumstances justified immediate custody. The central issue was whether the sentence was unlawful and had to be suspended.

Appeal allowed. The Court of Appeal held that section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 applied because the conviction followed the commencement date, the sentence was eight months, and none of the exclusions in section 277A(3) applied.

1. Once the court had determined that a sentence of no more than 12 months was appropriate, it had to decide whether exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or the offender justified not making a suspended sentence order. Immediate custody was available only after that finding had been made.
2. The Sentencing Council guideline’s table concerning whether suspension was appropriate has a different role where section 277A applies. The critical, and perhaps often the only remaining, question is whether exceptional circumstances exist. The court did not attempt to define or list every circumstance that might qualify.
3. The statutory word exceptional is strong. The circumstances must be uncommon. Seriousness alone was unlikely to satisfy the test because section 277A applies only to sentences of no more than 12 months. It could not be exceptional that the sentence should really have been longer. Although the offending was very serious and could have justified a sentence exceeding 12 months, the Recorder had assessed the sentence at eight months after mitigation and credit for the guilty plea.
4. The Recorder had not addressed section 277A or made a finding of exceptional circumstances. He was therefore required to suspend the sentence. The court quashed the immediate sentence and substituted an eight-month suspended sentence order, operative for two years, with 15 Rehabilitation Activity Requirement sessions and no punitive requirements. The disqualification was reduced to 18 months, with the extended driving test requirement retained and the four-month custody-related extension removed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 19 June 2026, the court granted leave to appeal, allowed the sentence appeal, quashed the immediate sentence and substituted a suspended sentence order. The decision is reported at [2026] EWCA Crim 886.
• Crown Court: Following conviction after a guilty plea, the court imposed eight months’ immediate imprisonment and a 22-month driving disqualification.
• Newport Magistrates’ Court: The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence under the Sentencing Act 2020.