R v Adel Kerari

An Attorney General’s Reference may correct an unduly lenient sentence, but the Court of Appeal retains discretion whether to increase it. In sentencing multiple offences, the court must impose a sentence that reflects the offending as a whole. Concurrent terms do not remove the need for a meaningful totality assessment, although the offences must not simply be multiplied. A reduction for delay requires proper justification. The court must also avoid unjustified disparity with co-offenders sentenced at another time. Here, the sentence was increased from 32 to 45 months’ imprisonment after correcting the totality assessment, rejecting the delay reduction and applying a 25 per cent guilty-plea discount.

The Attorney General referred, under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, a sentence imposed at the Crown Court at Inner London. Adel Kerari had pleaded guilty to six robberies and one fraud and received concurrent terms of 32 months’ imprisonment, with one-third credit for his guilty pleas.

The reference alleged that the sentence was unduly lenient because the judge had failed to reflect totality, had made an unjustified reduction for delay, had reduced the sentence to achieve parity with co-defendants, and had allowed excessive credit for plea. The central issue was whether the sentence required correction and, if so, what sentence properly reflected the offending while avoiding unjustified disparity.

The reference was allowed. Leave was granted under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The concurrent 32-month terms were quashed and concurrent terms of 45 months’ imprisonment were substituted on each count.

1. Approach. The trial judge is normally best placed to assess the relevant sentencing matters. The reference jurisdiction exists to correct gross errors. Even where a sentence is unduly lenient, the Court of Appeal retains a discretion not to increase it. The sentencing task is to impose a sentence that is just and proportionate to the offending as a whole.
2. Totality. The judge had referred to totality and had ordered concurrent sentences, but there was no discernible uplift for the other criminality. Each robbery involved significant force and the offending affected six separate victims. The court considered that each offence merited a five-year starting point and that, before mitigation, the overall sentence could not properly have been less than eight years. It was impermissible simply to multiply a single-offence sentence, but proper regard had to be given to the separate offending and its cumulative impact.
3. Delay and plea credit. Delay did not justify a reduction because, after the conditional discharge and before knowing that he was wanted, the offender travelled to Ireland and committed a further offence for which he was imprisoned. The fact that he had been kept outside the jurisdiction while serving that sentence did not justify increasing the guilty-plea discount from 25 per cent to one third.
4. Parity. The court recognised the need to avoid unjustified disparity with co-defendants sentenced at an earlier stage. Although the offending might otherwise have warranted a higher figure, the court selected five years’ imprisonment to reflect all the circumstances, including parity. Applying the appropriate 25 per cent discount produced 45 months. The court considered Attorney General’s Reference No 44 of 2025 (R v Guirdham (Daniel)) [2025] EWCA Crim 2211 as an example concerning disparity, while noting that it established no general principle.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2026] EWCA Crim 908 , leave was granted and the reference was allowed. The concurrent 32-month terms imposed below were quashed and concurrent 45-month terms substituted on each count.
• Crown Court at Inner London: On 9 January 2026, the respondent was sentenced to concurrent terms of 32 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to six robberies and one fraud.