R v Elaijah Sengati

When sentencing a person for an offence committed before 18, but after the person has turned 18, the court must apply the youth sentencing guideline unless doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. The starting point is the sentence likely to have been imposed shortly after the offence. An appellate court should interfere with a decision whether to suspend custody only where a material consideration was omitted, an irrelevant consideration was relied upon, or the discretion was exercised unreasonably. Strong mitigation and rehabilitation prospects do not require suspension where public risk and the seriousness of possessing and preparing a lethal firearm justify immediate custody.

After a jury conviction at the Crown Court at Snaresbrook for possessing a prohibited firearm contrary to the Firearms Act 1968, section 5(1)(aba), the applicant received 20 months’ detention in a young offender institution. The offence was committed when he was treated as 15, but he was sentenced after turning 18. The sentencing judge disregarded the youth sentencing guidelines and refused to suspend custody, despite extensive personal mitigation, a modern slavery finding and positive rehabilitation evidence.

The Registrar referred the application for leave to appeal against sentence to the full court. The Court of Appeal considered both the correct route to the determinate sentence and whether immediate custody was an error in principle or an unreasonable exercise of discretion.

Application refused.

1. Correct approach to sentence length. The approach in R v Ahmed [2023] EWCA Crim 281; [2023] 1 WLR 1858 applied. Where an offence was committed under 18 but sentence is imposed after the offender has turned 18, the court must have regard to and apply the youth sentencing guidelines unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice. The starting point must be the sentence likely to have been imposed if the child had been sentenced shortly after the offence. The judge was wrong to disregard the youth guidelines, and it was unclear that he had adopted the required starting point.
2. Reassessment. The court accepted the relevant categorisation and the adult starting point of five and a half years. Applying the youth guidelines reduced that figure by about half to 33 months. A further nine-month reduction reflected personal mitigation, psychological evidence and the applicant’s progress. Four months were deducted for the loss of liberty in local-authority accommodation. The resulting sentence of 20 months was not inappropriate in length, although the judge had reached it by an inappropriate route.
3. Suspension. Whether to suspend custody was a discretionary sentencing decision. Appellate intervention required a material consideration to have been omitted, an irrelevant consideration to have been relied upon, or the discretion to have been exercised unreasonably. The judge had considered the mitigation, rehabilitation prospects, welfare and need for a positive future. There was no identifiable misdirection.
4. The judge was entitled to conclude that public risk and the seriousness of possessing and preparing a lethal weapon justified immediate custody. The absence of coercion and the applicant’s failure to explain his involvement were relevant to the assessment of rehabilitation. Having heard the trial, the judge was well placed to assess the risk posed. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was therefore refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The application for leave to appeal against sentence was referred to the full court and refused: [2026] EWCA Crim 994 .
2. Crown Court at Snaresbrook — Following conviction after trial, His Honour Judge Falk sentenced the applicant to 20 months’ detention in a young offender institution.