Sangeeta Mittal v Barclays Bank Plc & Ors

Permission to amend a statement of case should be assessed by applying the merits test to any genuinely new case advanced by the proposed amendments. The proposed case must be coherent, adequately particularised and supported by a proper factual basis, with no real prospect of success. The court should not conduct a mini-trial or determine defects already present in the existing pleading on an amendment application. Where the case concerns developing areas of law, summary disposal is generally inappropriate. Even if the merits test is satisfied, the court retains a discretion to refuse amendment, balancing the relevant interests under the overriding objective.

The claimant occupied a London property acquired and mortgaged through companies associated with her family. Following default under the mortgage, Barclays appointed receivers. The claimant sought permission to amend her claim to plead proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trust claims, to assert that her interest overrode the mortgage, to rescind a licence agreement, and to challenge the receivers’ appointment.

She also sought to join Meadswell Estates Limited, the legal owner of the property, and to serve the amended claim out of the jurisdiction. The central issues were whether the proposed amendments satisfied the merits test, whether existing issues concerning the mortgage and subrogation should be determined at that stage, and whether the proposed challenge to the receivers’ appointment had a sustainable basis.

1. Amendment principles. The court applied the principles summarised in Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB). The merits test applies to any new case advanced by the proposed amendments. The pleading must be coherent, sufficiently particularised, disclose reasonable grounds, and be supported by evidence establishing a proper factual basis. The court may reject an implausible or self-contradictory case, but must avoid a mini-trial.
2. The merits test does not apply to an issue that is already part of the existing case merely because the proposed amendments develop it. If an existing case has a fatal flaw, the appropriate course is a direct application for strike out or reverse summary judgment. The court retains a separate discretion to refuse amendment, including where required by the interests of justice and the overriding objective.
3. The proposed proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trust claims were sufficiently coherent and arguable. The alleged assurances, common intentions and detrimental reliance arising from relocation from Kolkata to London could not be finally evaluated without a trial. The court was not prepared to decide summarily whether an intention that the property be a home for life could found a constructive trust.
4. The Letter of Consent was capable of postponing any interest of the claimant to the 2002 Charge, but was not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of an equity assertable against the original purchaser or Meadswell. The potential effect of subrogation to discharged securities was insufficiently developed and was not determined on the amendment application.
5. Permission to amend was therefore granted in respect of the proprietary estoppel and common intention constructive trust claims. The proposed challenge to the receivers’ appointment was refused because no sustainable basis for questioning its validity had been pleaded.
6. Determination of the proposed rescission claim was deferred. The claimant was directed to provide proper particulars of the alleged authority of the persons said to have acted as Meadswell’s servants or agents. Meadswell was joined and service out of the jurisdiction was permitted in relation to the permitted amendments. Further directions, including costs, were reserved.

Not an appeal. The judgment determined an application for permission to amend, joinder and service out of the jurisdiction.