BUJ, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Bromley

A local authority proposing to close a long-established community service for an identifiable cohort may owe a common-law duty to consult, even where the service is discretionary and alternative provision is planned. Consultation must occur before the closure decision, although later consultation about implementation may remain appropriate. A breach of the Tameside duty is established only where no reasonable authority could have been satisfied that it possessed the information necessary for the decision. The public sector equality duty requires rigorous and conscientious consideration of equality impacts before and during decision-making, but does not require elimination of every disadvantage. Relief may nevertheless be refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 where it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different.

The claimant, an autistic adult with learning disabilities and epilepsy, challenged the London Borough of Bromley’s decision to close the Poverest Adult Education Centre and restructure provision through a Kentwood hub and satellite spoke locations.

He alleged failure to consult fairly, breach of the Tameside duty to make adequate inquiries, and breach of the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The defendant contended that the claim was out of time and that relief should in any event be refused because the outcome would inevitably, or highly likely, have been the same.

1. The claim was issued promptly in the circumstances. The January 2025 decision to close Poverest was not conditional, but the defendant’s later references to a potential or proposed closure and an intended consultation reasonably caused uncertainty. An extension of time was therefore granted.

2. Long-term users of Poverest had a legitimate expectation of consultation. The centre provided a significant local benefit to an identifiable cohort, including adults with learning disabilities, and supported social as well as educational needs. The principles in R (Moseley) v Haringey LBC, R v Devon County Council, Ex p Baker and R (LH) v Shropshire applied. Fairness required consultation before the decision to close and relocate specialist provision. Later consultation about the operational hub-and-spoke arrangements could not cure the failure to consult on closure itself.

3. The Tameside ground failed. The defendant’s reports and evidence provided a rational basis for concluding that the required services could be delivered elsewhere, with specialist facilities at Kentwood and other provision at spoke locations. The defendant was not required to know every user’s personal circumstances or provide services in a particular location. It had sufficient information and was entitled to determine how relevant factors should be weighed.

4. The public sector equality duty was complied with. The defendant’s equality impact assessment recognised longer travel, increased costs, disruption to established routines and the risk that some disabled users would lose practical access to specialist courses. It considered mitigation and was entitled to conclude that the restructuring would produce overall advantages, while accepting that not every disadvantage would disappear.

5. Despite the consultation breach, section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 required refusal of relief. The court had to assess the significance of the error in the decision-making process, without predicting the merits afresh or assuming what the authority might have done. On the evidence, it was highly likely that proper consultation would not have materially altered the outcome: Kentwood was the only realistic hub and Poverest the only realistic site for closure and affordable housing. No exceptional public interest justified withholding the statutory consequence.

6. Permission was granted to the extent necessary for the rolled-up hearing, but the application for judicial review was dismissed and relief refused.

First-instance judicial review decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.