BUJ, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Bromley

A public authority has no general common law duty to consult before adopting a measure. Fairness may nevertheless require consultation where identifiable service users have a pressing and focussed interest in continued provision for their particular benefit. Closing a centre without consulting such users may be irrational and breach their legitimate expectation of consultation.

An unlawful failure to consult does not automatically prevent refusal of judicial review relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The statutory threshold remains high. Courts must assess the omission’s significance without determining the merits of the public decision. Where representations could affect the choice between available options, a possible or probable repetition of the decision does not establish that the outcome would highly likely remain substantially unchanged.

BUJ, an adult with learning disabilities, atypical autism and epilepsy, brought judicial review proceedings through his father and litigation friend. He had attended the London Borough of Bromley’s Poverest Centre for about 14 years. The centre provided adult education, including specialist courses for learners with learning difficulties and disabilities. It was close to his home and supported his learning and personal relationships.

The council decided to close the centre as part of an estate review addressing financial pressures and housing needs. Adult education would move to another centre and satellite locations. An equality impact assessment identified accessibility and travel difficulties. The closure decision was taken in January 2025, but users were informed in April, after the three-month judicial review period had expired.

Andrew Burns KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, extended time but dismissed the claim in [2026] EWHC 102 (Admin). He found an unlawful failure to consult, yet refused relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. He rejected the public sector equality duty challenge and made no order as to costs. BUJ appealed those conclusions. The council cross-appealed the extension of time and the finding of a consultation duty. The principal questions concerned the existence of that duty and whether lawful consultation was highly likely to leave the outcome substantially unchanged.

Appeal allowed and cross-appeal dismissed. Dingemans LJ gave the judgment, with which Whipple and Baker LJJ agreed. The decision to close the Poverest Centre was quashed.

1. Judicial review time ran from when the grounds first arose, rather than when the claimant learned of the decision. An extension required a good reason. The judge’s extension was justified because the council communicated the decision after the ordinary time limit had expired and subsequent correspondence caused confusion. The claim could not realistically have been commenced earlier. The council had established neither substantial hardship nor detriment to good administration from the relatively short delay.

2. There was no general common law duty to consult. Fairness could nevertheless require consultation where affected persons had a pressing and focussed interest in the continuation of a policy for their particular benefit. The 99 learners with learning difficulties and disabilities were a small, readily identifiable group. For some, the centre was a focus of their lives outside their homes. They reasonably expected continued provision there, subject to notification and consultation before a change. Closing it without consulting them and their carers was irrational and breached their legitimate expectation. The residential home and day centre authorities provided material analogies.

3. The discussion of prejudice in Stonehenge did not impose an additional requirement separate from the fact-sensitive inquiry into fairness. It illustrated why unfairness was unlikely where nobody had been prejudiced or affected. Here, depriving the learners and their carers of consultation plainly prejudiced them.

4. The public sector equality duty challenge failed. The duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 required substantive, rigorous consideration with an open mind, rather than a particular result. The executive’s equality impact assessment addressed the learners’ needs, longer journeys and associated disruption. It enabled the executive to discharge the duty. The dispute about whether an assessment box referred to removing or mitigating barriers did not alter that conclusion.

5. Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 imposed a mandatory refusal of relief where its high threshold was met, subject to exceptional public interest. An unlawful failure to consult could satisfy that test on appropriate facts. Courts must evaluate the error’s significance while avoiding the merits of the public decision. Here, consultation could have influenced the choice between several options, including retaining limited provision alongside housing. Other properties had ceased to be candidates for disposal, and the plans themselves had changed. The evidence therefore did not establish that closure would highly likely remain the outcome. Repetition of the decision might be possible or probable, but that was insufficient.

6. The council must consult the learners and their carers in accordance with the Gunning principles before deciding whether to close the centre. The correctness of the earlier costs decision did not arise because the judicial review claim now succeeded.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2026] EWCA Civ 888 , unanimously allowed BUJ’s appeal and dismissed the council’s cross-appeal. Quashed the closure decision, upheld the extension of time and consultation duty, and rejected the public sector equality duty challenge.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Andrew Burns KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the judicial review claim in [2026] EWHC 102 (Admin) . He extended time and found an unlawful failure to consult, but refused relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. He rejected the equality duty and adequate inquiry grounds and made no order as to costs.