John Stenhouse v The Bar Standards Board

An appeal from a barristers’ disciplinary tribunal is a review, not a rehearing. The appellate court respects findings and evaluative judgments below unless the decision was wrong, unjust because of serious procedural irregularity, or outside the proper range of discretion.

In disciplinary proceedings, charges may be proved by the objective meaning and implication of written communications. The tribunal is confined to the charges, but need not reproduce the respondent’s precise words where the charge fairly captures their substance. Serious, unfounded personal allegations against judicial or tribunal officials may constitute professional misconduct, even where expressed during litigation and alongside legitimate legal submissions.

John Stenhouse, a barrister, appealed under section 24 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 against a Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 23 June 2025. The tribunal found proved two allegations that emails sent during Mr Stenhouse’s tax proceedings made unfounded allegations of misconduct against a tribunal caseworker, an HMRC officer and the President of the First-tier Tribunal, contrary to Core Duty 5. It dismissed allegations based on integrity, rudeness and failure to apologise.

The appeal challenged, among other matters, apparent bias, the scope of the charges, freedom of expression, abuse of process, the standard of proof, procedural fairness, sanction and costs. The central issues were whether the tribunal had materially erred in its approach to the written communications and whether its findings or sanctions were outside the permissible appellate range.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appeal was a review rather than a rehearing. Appropriate respect was due to the Disciplinary Tribunal, which had heard the evidence and submissions. Intervention was justified only for a wrong or unjust decision caused by serious procedural or other irregularity. The same restrained approach applied to sanction.
2. The tribunal applied the correct apparent-bias test from Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67. Questions asked by the chair, viewed by a fair-minded and informed observer with the characteristics of a barrister, were legitimate probing of the appellant’s case and did not establish a real possibility of bias. Brief reasons for refusing recusal were adequate.
3. The tribunal was confined to the charges as formulated and particularised. That principle, reflected in R v GMC ex parte Roomi [2009] EWHC 2188 (Admin), Chauhan v GMC [2010] EWHC 2093 (Admin) and Thaker v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2011] EWHC 660 (Admin), did not assist the appellant. The evidence was written and spoke for itself. The allegation of a secret proceeding necessarily implied collusion between HMRC and the FTT, so the tribunal had not altered the case by describing it as a conspiracy.
4. The tribunal was entitled to find that the allegations were serious, unfounded and insulting. The appellant’s communications contained personal accusations of misconduct, rather than merely robust legal submissions or opinions on judicial reasoning. The freedom of expression principles discussed in Diggins v BSB [2020] EWHC 467 (Admin) and Morice v France [2016] 62 EHRR 1 did not protect those accusations.
5. The civil standard of proof applied under rE164 of the BSB Enforcement Regulations. The tribunal was bound by Bibi v BSB [2022] EWHC 921 (Admin), and the approved amendment to the regulations required no primary legislation.
6. The findings under Core Duty 5 were not inconsistent with dismissing the integrity allegation. The tribunal was entitled to impose two fines of £7,500, follow the sanctions guidance, and order payment of the BSB’s costs.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the Disciplinary Tribunal’s Report of Finding and Sanction dated 23 June 2025 dismissed on all grounds.