Diggins v Bar Standards Board

Professional disciplinary jurisdiction is not confined by a bright line between private and public conduct. The question under Core Duty 5 is whether the conduct, assessed in all the circumstances, is likely to undermine public trust and confidence in the barrister or the profession. Social-media meaning is assessed objectively by reference to the ordinary reasonable reader and relevant context; the identity or reaction of an actual complainant is immaterial. The warning in Stocker v Stocker against over-elaborate interpretation does not prevent a tribunal finding a post seriously offensive. A single tweet can cross the seriousness threshold for professional misconduct. Disciplinary sanctions engage Articles 8 and 10, but may be justified where necessary and proportionate to protecting the reputation, rights and legitimate interests of others.

The appellant, a barrister, appealed under section 24 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 against a unanimous decision of a Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court. The Tribunal found that a public tweet containing racially charged and sexually derogatory language breached Core Duty 5 of the Bar Standards Board Handbook. It imposed a reprimand and a £1,000 fine.

The appeal challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, alleged political motivation, bias and procedural unfairness, disputed the interpretation and likely effect of the tweet, relied on freedom of expression and privacy rights, and argued that the finding and sanction were irrational or excessive. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had erred in law or acted unjustly through serious procedural irregularity, and whether its conclusions and penalty were within the permissible range.

1. Appeal framework. Under section 24(6) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and CPR r 52.21(3), the High Court could make any appropriate order, but the appeal would succeed only if the Tribunal’s decision was wrong or unjust because of serious procedural or other irregularity. The appeal ordinarily proceeded by way of review, with appropriate respect accorded to the expert disciplinary tribunal.
2. Private conduct and Core Duty 5. The BSB Handbook guidance was not a statute or hard-edged jurisdictional rule. There was no bright line separating private from public conduct. The controlling question was whether the conduct, considered in all its circumstances, was likely to undermine trust and confidence in the barrister or the profession. Public conduct could be too trivial, while private conduct could cross the threshold.
3. Meaning and evidence. The Tribunal properly applied the impressionistic and objective approach in Stocker v Stocker. The actual complainant’s identity, characteristics, motives and reaction were irrelevant. The issue concerned the likely response of the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader. The Tribunal was entitled to treat the tweet’s racial and sexual language as seriously offensive and likely to diminish public confidence.
4. Human rights and seriousness. The tweet was protected speech under Article 10(1) and engaged Article 8(1). The interference required justification under Articles 8(2) and 10(2), including necessity and proportionality. The Tribunal considered the relevant factors and was entitled to find that the language was particularly grave. The seriousness principle in Walker v Bar Standards Board did not immunise a single tweet; whether the threshold was crossed was a matter of judgment.
5. Disposition. No error of law, procedural unfairness, perversity or apparent bias was established. The liability appeal was dismissed. The penalty appeal was also dismissed. A reprimand with a fine up to £1,000 was within the applicable guidance, and the £1,000 fine was not manifestly excessive.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court was dismissed. The Tribunal’s finding of professional misconduct and its reprimand and £1,000 fine were upheld.
• Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court: On 26 September 2019, the Tribunal unanimously found the charge proved and imposed the sanction.