Sentinel Estates Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

The four-year immunity period in section 171B(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 does not extend to a change of use to a house in multiple occupation. Although an HMO may be a dwellinghouse, the expression “use as a single dwellinghouse” concerns the manner of use and excludes multiple occupation. Parliamentary material may be used under Pepper v Hart where the statutory language is ambiguous and the ministerial statement is clear and directed to the issue. Later delegated legislation is not a reliable guide to Parliament’s intention where it was enacted many years later. A withdrawn government circular may assist as persuasive guidance, but cannot determine statutory meaning.

The appellant challenged an inspector’s decision upholding an enforcement notice concerning the change of use of two flats to an HMO. The inspector applied the ten-year immunity period and rejected the ground (d) appeal. Before the High Court, the appellant argued that the former four-year period in section 171B(2) applied because the HMO was a dwellinghouse.

The court considered whether that argument was a new point, whether it should be admitted on a section 289 appeal, and the proper construction of “use as a single dwellinghouse”. It also considered parliamentary material, the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, Circular 10/97 and the Planning Inspectorate’s Training Manual.

1. New point. The argument that section 171B(2) applied was a new point. The appellant’s final position before the inspector had accepted that the ten-year rule applied. If the four-year argument had been advanced, the inspector would also have had to determine whether the 2020 and 2023 enforcement notices concerned the same actual breach for the purposes of the second-bite provision in section 171B(4). That would have required an additional judgment on mixed questions of law and fact. Applying Singh v Dass, the point was not admitted.
2. Statutory construction. The court nevertheless considered the merits. Under Pepper v Hart, the ministerial statement concerning the 1968 legislation was sufficiently clear and directly addressed to the issue. It showed an intention to exclude changes of use to multi-occupation from the four-year rule. The later provision in Class L of Part 3 of Schedule 2 to the GPDO was not a contemporaneous guide to the meaning intended by Parliament.
3. Dwellinghouse and single dwellinghouse. Applying London Borough of Brent v Secretary of State for Levelling-up Housing and Communities and the Gravesham test, an HMO may be a dwellinghouse if it affords the facilities required for day-to-day private domestic existence. That does not answer whether it is used as a single dwellinghouse. In section 171B(2), “single” qualifies the use, rather than merely the numerical number of dwellinghouses. It excludes use as a dwellinghouse in multiple occupation.
4. The inspector therefore did not err in applying the ten-year period. The appeal was dismissed. The merits reasoning was an alternative ground, since the refusal to admit the new point was sufficient.

The appeal was brought to the High Court under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against an inspector’s decision dated 27 May 2025. The inspector varied the compliance period but otherwise upheld the enforcement notice. The High Court dismissed the appeal.