Mead Realisations Limited v The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor

The flood-risk sequential test is an open-textured planning policy. It asks whether reasonably available sites appropriate for the proposed development exist in areas with lower flood risk. It does not automatically require alternatives to match every feature of the application proposal, including its precise form, quantum or delivery trajectory. The decision-maker must exercise planning judgment, allowing flexibility and realism on all sides. Specific need or market demand may affect the area of search and the description of development assessed. General housing need and a five-year housing-land shortfall do not determine whether an alternative is appropriate, but may be relevant in the overall planning balance. The National Planning Policy Framework and Planning Practice Guidance may be read together; neither is a binding legal code.

Two developers brought statutory challenges under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to Inspectors’ decisions dismissing appeals concerning proposed residential developments in flood-risk areas. The Lynchmead proposal was for up to 75 dwellings in North Somerset. The Bushey proposal was for up to 310 dwellings, together with land for a primary school, community facilities and a mobility hub, in Hertsmere.

Both challenges concerned the interpretation and application of paragraph 162 of the National Planning Policy Framework, paragraph 028 of the Planning Practice Guidance, and the relevance of development requirements, timing, disaggregation and housing need. The court also considered whether the Lynchmead Inspector had lawfully treated part of a local policy as inconsistent with national policy, and whether the Bushey Inspector had failed to address the claimant’s case on smaller sites and unmet housing need.

1. Disposition. Both claims were dismissed. The court rejected all grounds advanced by Mead and Redrow.
2. Status of national policy. The National Planning Policy Framework, written ministerial statements and Planning Practice Guidance derive from the Secretary of State’s statutory planning responsibilities. They are policy and guidance rather than statute, and neither has binding legal effect. Planning policy must not be treated as a binding code. The court must distinguish objective interpretation from application, which ordinarily involves planning judgment.
3. Sequential test. Paragraph 162 is broad and open-textured. The decision-maker must identify whether reasonably available sites appropriate for the proposed development exist in areas with lower flood risk. The policy does not require alternatives to match every feature of the proposal, such as precise form, site area, dwelling quantum or delivery timescale. The approach must give effect to the flood-risk objective while allowing realism and flexibility on all sides.
4. Need and availability. Specific need or market demand for a particular type of development may affect the area of search and whether sites are appropriate alternatives. Relevant matters may include location, land-use mix, interdependence, site size, scale, density, timing, ownership and flexibility. General housing need and a five-year housing-land shortfall do not determine whether an alternative is appropriate or reasonably available, although their implications may be considered in the overall planning balance.
5. Planning Practice Guidance. Paragraph 028 properly elucidates paragraph 162. It permits consideration of a series of smaller sites or part of a larger site, depending on the decision-maker’s assessment of development type, size, location, ownership, timing and flexibility. The absence of a five-year housing-land supply is not relevant to the sequential test for an individual application.
6. Mead. The Lynchmead Inspector was entitled to treat alternative residential sites as reasonably available despite imperfect alignment of development trajectories, and to treat the proposal’s type as residential development generally. Mead had not advanced evidence of a specific need for low-density suburban family housing.
7. Redrow. The Bushey Inspector should have addressed Redrow’s case that smaller, disconnected sites could not deliver the interconnected benefits of the proposed scheme. That error was immaterial because the treatment of larger sites independently supported the result. The Inspector was entitled to reject a demand for precise timing alignment. Redrow’s argument that unmet housing need should affect the sequential assessment was not advanced before the Inspector and could not properly be raised for the first time in the statutory challenge.
8. Finality. New evidence or submissions should not ordinarily be used to quash an Inspector’s decision where they would require further findings of fact or a fresh planning judgment. Parties are generally expected to advance their whole case at the inquiry.

These were first-instance statutory challenges in the High Court (Planning Court). The judgment describes the underlying appeals to Inspectors but states no prior appellate decision in the same proceedings.