Bent v Cambridgeshire County Council & Anor

In a planning judicial review, the court must distinguish construing planning guidance from applying it to the facts. A decision-maker need not recite guidance verbatim if the decision shows that it was understood and applied. Technical disputes about noise and mitigation are ordinarily matters of planning judgment, not issues for the court to retry. Judicial review is not an opportunity to introduce ex post facto expert evidence to challenge or support the planning decision.

Planning conditions should be construed benevolently and in context. A condition is not unlawful merely because it leaves technical matters to professional judgment or could have been drafted more precisely. It is invalid only where it has no sensible or ascertainable meaning.

The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant local planning authority’s decision to grant the interested party planning permission for an extension to a limestone quarry. The challenge concerned noise impacts on nearby residential properties.

The claimant alleged that the authority had failed to apply the National Planning Practice Guidance, had failed to give adequate reasons, and had imposed an uncertain and unenforceable noise condition. The authority and interested party relied on the officer’s report, environmental health advice, mitigation conditions and the principles governing planning judicial review.

1. Application dismissed. The authority was entitled to adopt the substance of the officer’s report in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
2. The National Planning Practice Guidance on mineral extraction noise had been properly understood and applied. The advice that noise should normally be limited to no more than 10 dB(A) above background, subject to practicability and a maximum of 55 dB(A), did not require a verbatim recital. The officer’s advice and the report showed that the relevant guidance had been considered. The decision whether a further bund was justified, having regard to its predicted attenuation of only 2 dB, was a matter of reasonable planning judgment.
3. Technical questions concerning predicted noise, mitigation and acoustic effects were matters for the planning authority. Judicial review was not a forum for resolving those disputes or for retrying the planning application on its merits. New expert evidence produced after the decision was generally inadmissible where it sought to undermine the judgment made on the information available to the decision-maker.
4. The reasons were legally adequate. Reading the officer’s report straightforwardly and as a whole, there was no genuine doubt about what the authority decided or why. The conclusions on noise and mitigation were sufficiently explained.
5. Condition 13 was not void for uncertainty. Its reference to BS4142 naturally meant the version in force when permission was granted, namely BS4142:2014. The standard provided substantial guidance for measurement and assessment, and its application could properly involve specialist acoustic judgment. Uncertainty was not to be confused with technical matters left to expert evaluation.

The remaining issues concerning the court’s discretion and sections 31(2A) and 31(3C) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not arise.