George Martin & Ors (R, on the Application of) v The Chancellor of the Exchequer & Anor

[2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin)
Court
High Court (King's Bench Division)
Judgment date
12 May 2026
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative Public law Legitimate expectation
Keywords
legitimate expectation tax consultation Parliamentary privilege justiciability inheritance tax agricultural property relief business property relief Gunning principles judicial review standing
Outcome
application dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A legitimate expectation of consultation requires a representation that is clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification, understood fairly from the promise and its context. General tax-policy frameworks containing qualifications, exceptions and retained governmental discretion do not ordinarily create an enforceable promise to consult on the merits of a particular tax reform. The Gunning principles regulate the adequacy of a consultation that takes place; they do not impose a duty to consult. Nor is there a general common-law duty of fairness requiring consultation before legislation is adopted. Executive decisions forming part of Parliament’s exclusive budgetary process may be protected by Parliamentary privilege and therefore non-justiciable, including certain pre-legislative decisions closely connected with the laying of a Bill.

Factual background

The claimants, farmers and an association representing farmers and businesses, sought judicial review of the government’s Technical Consultation on reforms to agricultural property relief and business property relief from inheritance tax. They argued that earlier tax-policy documents created a legitimate expectation of a broader consultation on the substance of the reforms, and relied alternatively on failure to follow policy, the Gunning principles and fairness. The defendants contended that the claim was without merit, out of time and non-justiciable, including by reason of Parliamentary privilege. The court also considered the standing of the third claimant and other procedural issues.

Held

The court refused permission for judicial review. The claim failed on three independent grounds: absence of a legitimate expectation, delay, and non-justiciability.

  1. Legitimate expectation. The test requires both a representation sufficiently clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification, and unfairness in frustrating the resulting expectation. The 2010 policy paper was a discussion document. The 2011 Framework document and 2017 policy paper contained qualified commitments, including consultation where possible, consultation where the government could do so, stated exceptions, and a power to deviate from the framework. They did not promise consultation on the merits of every tax reform or on these reforms. The government’s technical consultation satisfied the stated commitment to at least one formal public consultation in an area of significant reform. The documents were political commitments rather than legally enforceable public-law promises.
  2. The policy-following ground necessarily failed because no policy requiring consultation of the asserted breadth had been adopted. The Gunning principles concern the procedural adequacy of a consultation which occurs; they do not determine whether consultation was required in the first place. There is no free-standing common-law duty of fairness requiring consultation before the changes were adopted.
  3. Time. The claim challenged the decision announced on 30 October 2024 to proceed with the reforms while limiting the future consultation to technical matters concerning trust property. Time therefore began then under CPR r.54.5(1). The claim, lodged in May 2025, was out of time, and no good reason for an extension was shown.
  4. Parliamentary privilege. The Budget announcement and the associated decision to limit the consultation formed part of the Parliamentary process for raising public revenue. Privilege extends beyond proceedings already initiated in Parliament where the earlier executive act is sufficiently connected to, and proximate to, those proceedings. A court cannot avoid the constitutional restriction by granting relief directed only at the earlier act if that relief would cast a shadow over or taint Parliament’s legislative product. The court distinguished cases involving discrete preliminary steps which were not part of the protected process.
  5. The third claimant had sufficient interest and standing. The court did not determine admissibility, academicness or relief.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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