The Greyhound Board of Great Britain Limited, R (on the application of) v The Welsh Ministers

Introducing a Bill into the Senedd is an initiating and integral part of Senedd legislative proceedings. The courts cannot superimpose a common law duty to consult before that step, since doing so would infringe the constitutional separation of powers and the Senedd’s plenary legislative authority.

Under Government of Wales Act 2006, an Act remains valid despite invalidity in the Senedd proceedings leading to its enactment. The statutory scheme also provides a specific procedure for challenges to Bills on defined subject-matter grounds, which supports the conclusion that wider procedural challenges are unavailable.

A challenge to an earlier pre-legislative statement became academic once the Bill had been validly introduced and completed its legislative stages.

The claimant, a company representing the greyhound-racing industry, sought judicial review of a statement by the Deputy First Minister announcing an intention to ban greyhound racing in Wales. It alleged breach of a legitimate expectation that the Welsh Ministers would consult before changing policy.

After the Prohibition of Greyhound Racing (Wales) Bill had been introduced into the Senedd, the claimant applied to amend its claim to challenge the decision to introduce the Bill. The central issue was whether that decision, and the earlier statement, could be challenged for failure to consult without impermissibly interfering with Senedd proceedings.

1. Amendment granted; claim dismissed. The claimant was permitted to amend its claim to challenge the Welsh Ministers’ decision of 29 September 2025 to introduce the Bill, but the claim failed.
2. The Senedd has plenary legislative powers within its legislative competence. Consistently with Axa General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, the courts cannot review legislation on grounds of irrationality, unreasonableness or arbitrariness. Section 107(3) of the Government of Wales Act 2006 further provides that an Act’s validity is unaffected by invalidity in the Senedd proceedings leading to its enactment.
3. Introducing a Bill under s. 110(1), whether by a Welsh Minister or another Member of the Senedd, is subject to standing orders and forms the initiating step in Senedd proceedings. It is therefore part of the legislative process for making primary legislation.
4. The Senedd’s own legislative procedures provide the means by which competing views and interests are considered. Judicial review cannot impose an additional prior consultation requirement on the decision to introduce legislation. No common law duty to consult could properly be implied into s. 110, and no such obligation could be superimposed on it.
5. The statutory procedures in ss. 111B and 112, enabling specified law officers to refer Bills to the Supreme Court on defined subject-matter grounds within a specified period, reinforced that conclusion. A broader procedural challenge by other persons before a first-instance court would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
6. The challenge to the February 2025 statement was academic. The Bill had completed its legislative stages, the Welsh Ministers had no power to withdraw it, and a finding of an earlier procedural flaw could not affect the Bill’s validity or anyone’s rights. Determining that issue would also impermissibly interfere with completed Senedd proceedings.
7. The Llywydd was discharged as a party. The Senedd Commission remained an interested party, consistently with Attorney General v National Assembly for Wales Commission and others [2012] UKSC 52.