Evangelos Marinakis v Eirini Karypidou & Ors

In determining meaning as a preliminary issue in a libel claim, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning which the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the publication to bear. The assessment is fact-sensitive and depends on the publication as a whole, including hyperlinked material which the reasonable reader would read as part of the publication. The court must assess fact and opinion together rather than in separate stages. Allegations may fall at any point across the spectrum described by the Chase levels. A publication may contain factual assertions which provide the basis for an opinion, without the whole publication thereby becoming opinion. A statement is defamatory at common law where it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and have a substantially adverse effect on how people would be treated.

The claimant brought claims for libel and unlawful means conspiracy concerning 17 publications, including website articles, YouTube videos, posts on X and mobile billboards. The claimant sought damages and injunctive relief. The defendants denied liability and responsibility for the publications. The first defendant also relied on truth, honest opinion and public interest defences.

Following a direction by Steyn J, the court conducted a trial on the papers concerning the natural and ordinary meaning of each publication, whether it was defamatory at common law, and whether it conveyed fact or opinion. The judgment determined only those preliminary issues and made no finding on the truth of the allegations or ultimate liability.

1. Preliminary issues. The court accepted the claimant’s case broadly, but not entirely, and directed that the statements of case be amended to reflect the meanings determined.
2. Meaning. Applying Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd and the approved approach in Millett v Corbyn, the court’s task was to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning understood by the hypothetical reasonable reader. The exercise was highly fact-sensitive and required consideration of the publication and its context as a whole.
3. Chase levels. The levels identified in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd were a useful shorthand for different points on a wider spectrum. The court accepted the claimant’s pleaded levels. In particular, the second website article conveyed strong grounds to suspect active involvement in heroin trafficking, rather than merely grounds for investigation.
4. Hyperlinks. The reasonable reader would read the hyperlinked website material when considering the YouTube posts, X posts and billboards. Those publications were short and, for the most part, either made little sense in isolation or did not tell the whole story. The linked material therefore informed their meaning.
5. Fact and opinion. The words “cynically and hypocritically” expressed opinion in context, but the substance of the first website article asserted facts which formed the basis of that opinion. The publications were otherwise statements of fact, save for the underlined words identified in the judgment as expressions of opinion.
6. Defamatory meaning. The court applied the common-law test stated in Millett v Corbyn. The publications were defamatory of the claimant at common law. The judgment did not determine whether the allegations were true or whether any defendant was ultimately liable.