Richard James Prior & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Police Federation of England and Wales

Statutory disciplinary procedures must be exercised within their express limits. Where a power is conferred on a named office-holder, substitution requires a narrowly construed statutory gateway and contemporaneous evidence of the exceptional circumstances relied upon. Suspension of an elected representative is a coercive measure, not a neutral administrative act. It requires fairness, consideration of less intrusive alternatives and, where speech is restricted, structured justification under Article 10.

A complaint-led procedure cannot be expanded into a general disciplinary inquiry or used to introduce allegations not made by a complainant. Decision-makers restricting political or public-interest speech must address legality, legitimate aim, pressing social need, necessity and proportionality. A later review cures an earlier defect only if it is a genuine de novo determination.

Two judicial review claims challenged decisions made by the Police Federation of England and Wales under its Ethics, Standards and Performance Procedure. Mr Prior challenged his suspension, the continuation of suspension, investigation decisions and the expansion of the investigation into matters beyond the written complaint. Mr Cooke challenged findings and sanctions arising from two social-media posts made as an elected branch chair.

The claims raised issues of statutory authority, procedural fairness, natural justice, rationality, proportionality and Article 10. The claims were heard together at an expedited rolled-up hearing. The central questions were whether the Federation had acted within Appendix 9 and whether restrictions and sanctions affecting elected representatives’ speech had been lawfully justified.

1. Mr Prior: The suspension power in paragraph 11 of Appendix 9 was vested in the National Secretary. Paragraph 6 permitted substitution only for narrowly construed and contemporaneously demonstrable exceptional reasons. The Memorandum of Understanding could not reallocate the statutory power. Urgency, reputational risk and administrative convenience did not satisfy the threshold. The initial suspension was therefore ultra vires.
2. The suspension appeal was procedurally unfair. Mr Prior was not given the complaints, the complainant’s identity or the substance of adverse material placed before the Appeal Panel. The original decision-maker also influenced the material supplied to the appellate panel, undermining independent review. Fairness required timely disclosure, a genuine opportunity to respond and impartial decision-making.
3. Suspension was a coercive measure with reputational and democratic consequences. The Federation failed to consider undertakings or targeted restrictions, failed to reassess necessity and proportionality after circumstances changed, and treated a later review as sufficient without conducting a genuine de novo determination. Restrictions on media engagement exceeded paragraph 11 and unlawfully interfered with Article 10.
4. The investigation and its terms of reference were unlawful. Appendix 9 was a closed, complaint-led scheme. It permitted particularisation of a complaint but not the addition of new allegations or unrelated topics without a fresh complaint and lawful authority. The investigation was expanded beyond the written complaint and the Chris Kaba issue was introduced without proper notice or justification.
5. Mr Cooke: The use of evaluative material in the investigator’s report did not itself breach natural justice. Appendix 9 did not establish a closed evidential code, and the Ethics Panel independently assessed the posts. Any imperfection was immaterial.
6. However, the Ethics Panel and Appeal Decision failed entirely to address Article 10. A decision restricting an elected representative’s public-interest speech must address whether the interference is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim under Article 10(2), responds to a pressing social need and is necessary and proportionate, including consideration of less restrictive alternatives. The omission was fundamental and could not be cured retrospectively.
7. All Mr Prior’s pleaded grounds succeeded. Mr Cooke’s claim succeeded in part. Declarations and quashing relief were granted as specified in the judgment. Costs were reserved.

The claims were brought as first-instance judicial reviews. Mr Prior’s claim was filed on 17 January 2025 and Mr Cooke’s on 6 May 2025. Interim relief applications were refused. On 12 September 2025 Lang J directed that the claims be heard together at an expedited rolled-up hearing addressing permission, amendment and academic grounds. This Court determined the substantive challenges and granted declaratory and quashing relief.