CJ Jones Solicitors LLP v John Sapsford

In defamation proceedings, the meaning of allegations such as “fraudulent charges” depends on the words read as a whole, their immediate context and the mode of publication. A bald allegation that solicitors knowingly charged fees without a proper basis is ordinarily a statement of fact and may be defamatory. Context may instead make the allegation an expression of opinion, particularly where the publication presents both sides of a genuine dispute and identifies the basis of the opinion. Derogatory language remains non-actionable where it conveys only general abuse and no specific defamatory imputation. The distinction between fact and opinion is highly fact-sensitive and is assessed by reference to the ordinary reasonable reader.

CJ Jones Solicitors LLP brought claims for defamation and malicious falsehood concerning six emails sent by John Sapsford between 4 and 13 April 2023. The claimant alleged that the emails conveyed that it and its partner, Stephen Fairburn, had dishonestly charged legal fees without any proper basis. The defendant contended that the words were opinions arising from a genuine dispute about the retainer, the identity of the person liable for fees and the work undertaken.

At a preliminary hearing directed by Master Dagnall, the court was required to determine the meaning of each complained-of statement, whether it was defamatory at common law, and whether it was fact or opinion.

1. Meaning. The court applied the principles summarised in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd and approved in Millett v Corbyn. Meaning was determined by the words themselves, read as a whole and in their immediate context, from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader.
2. Fraudulent charges. In the context of the first, third and sixth emails, “fraudulent charges” conveyed that the claimant or Fairburn had charged legal fees dishonestly and knowing that there was no proper basis for doing so. Those allegations were statements of fact and defamatory at common law.
3. Contextualised allegations. The allegations in the fourth email were expressed as the defendant’s position in a genuine, contextualised dispute. They were therefore opinions, although still defamatory. The fifth email conveyed no more than a dispute about the flat and legal fees, together with a proposal for informal mediation. It was not defamatory.
4. Opinion and abuse. The distinction between fact and opinion was assessed by the highly fact-sensitive approach described in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd and Blake v Fox. The remark that Fairburn “fabricates stuff”, considered in its context, was general derogatory abuse rather than a specific defamatory allegation.
5. Common-law defamation. The court applied the consensus requirement and threshold of seriousness described in Corbyn v Millett, including whether the imputation would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people and have a substantially adverse effect on how people treated it.
6. The issue whether Statement 2 was defamatory of the claimant firm, rather than only of Fairburn, was left for later determination at the parties’ request. The preliminary meanings and classifications were otherwise determined as summarised above.

The judgment concerned a first-instance preliminary issue hearing directed by Master Dagnall. No appellate decision is stated.