Sarah Jane Thirsk v Henry Stamford Thirsk & Ors

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, reasonable financial provision for a surviving spouse is assessed by a broad, fact-sensitive evaluation of the statutory factors. The court should ordinarily use the likely outcome on divorce as a cross-check, but that outcome is neither a ceiling nor a floor.

Pre-marital assets remain non-matrimonial unless the parties’ treatment of them over time shows that they became shared. The relevant inquiry includes the source, use, duration of employment and intention concerning the assets. A long period of cohabitation may count towards the duration of the marital relationship, although the absence of marriage may remain relevant to intention and expectations.

Testamentary wishes carry weight but cannot displace the requirement for reasonable provision. Provision may be assessed by reference to a finite capitalised period rather than a whole-of-life calculation.

The claimant, the deceased’s surviving spouse, sought reasonable financial provision from his estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The estate was substantial and comprised farming, land-development and hospitality assets. The first defendant, the deceased’s son and principal residuary beneficiary, proposed transferring the claimant’s home outright and paying a substantial lump sum, together with accrued interest and other benefits.

The parties had cohabited for approximately 18 years before marrying in 2021. The deceased died in April 2022, leaving the claimant a life interest in the matrimonial home, a £5 million legacy and personal chattels, with the residue passing to his son. The issues were whether the will made reasonable financial provision and, if not, what provision should be ordered, including the relevance of a notional divorce outcome, matrimonialisation of assets, needs, testamentary intention and the duration of any capitalised award.

1. Two-stage statutory assessment. The court applied the two-stage approach explained in Ilott v The Blue Cross & Ors [2017] UKSC 17: whether the will made reasonable financial provision, and, if not, what provision should now be made. The two stages substantially overlap and require a broad evaluation of the circumstances and the statutory factors.
2. Divorce cross-check. The claimant’s hypothetical entitlement on divorce was relevant but not determinative. The court treated the approximately 19-year relationship, including prior cohabitation, as the relevant period for assessing entitlement, while recognising that the fact that the parties married only at the end of the relationship remained relevant to intention and expectations. The approach in Fielden v Cunliffe [2005] EWCA Civ 1508 was applied with caution.
3. Sharing and matrimonialisation. Applying Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, pre-marital property was not subject to sharing merely because it funded the relationship. Assets initially non-matrimonial may become matrimonial where the parties’ treatment of them over time shows that they were treated as shared. Here, assets retained from before the relationship, valued at £9,127,734, remained outside sharing. Between one half and two thirds of assets acquired during the relationship with those resources were treated as matrimonialised, producing a notional sharing entitlement below the first defendant’s offer.
4. Needs. The claimant was not expected to return to work. Her reasonable annual expenditure was assessed at £275,000, including shooting costs. In a financial-remedies analysis, a 20-year capitalisation was realistic, producing a needs-based outcome of approximately £6 million including housing. A whole-of-life calculation was not appropriate on these facts.
5. 1975 Act outcome. The will’s restriction of the claimant’s home right to her lifetime and to non-cohabitation was unreasonable after the long relationship. However, the first defendant’s final offer, comprising the outright transfer of the home, £5 million, interest and the benefits already received, made reasonable financial provision. The court therefore replaced the will provision with the terms of that offer. The deceased’s wishes supported the preservation of the farming estate but could not themselves justify inadequate provision.