Safe Passage International & Ors, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

In reviewing a general immigration policy decision, the court gives appropriate respect to the decision-maker’s evaluative judgment, particularly where the decision balances public resources against uncertain effects on individual families. A temporary suspension of a bespoke family reunion route pending reform is not irrational merely because applicants may still qualify through a more demanding alternative route, where the suspension has a distinct public-resource and reform purpose.

The public sector equality duty applies according to its statutory scope. For a ministerial decision preparing changes to the Immigration Rules, the Equality Act’s exception for preparing an instrument made under an enactment may disapply the prohibition on discrimination, while leaving other equality duties applicable. The best interests of children in the United Kingdom remain a primary consideration under the children’s duty, but are weighed against other relevant considerations.

Three judicial review claims challenged the suspension of new applications under Appendix Family Reunion (Sponsors with Protection) and the provision for refugee family members to apply under Appendix FM. The claimants argued that the decision was irrational, inadequately assessed its impacts on children and protected groups, and breached the rules on bias, discrimination and family life. The court considered whether the temporary suspension and interim route were lawful, including whether the decision-making process met the relevant statutory and Convention duties.

1. All three claims were dismissed. The challenges concerned a temporary suspension of the bespoke refugee family reunion route pending wider reform, with an interim route available under Appendix FM.
2. Rationality and intensity of review. For an inquiry challenge, the question was whether a reasonable authority could be satisfied that it had the information necessary to decide; for an unstatutory relevant consideration, the question was whether it was so obviously material that omitting it was irrational. The court afforded substantial respect to the Secretary of State’s evaluative judgment. The decision concerned immigration policy, the allocation of scarce public resources, a general policy affecting many people, parliamentary scrutiny and a polycentric balance of incommensurable factors. The anxious-scrutiny approach did not apply.
3. Outcome irrationality. The reasoning in Asylum Aid [2025] EWHC 316 (Admin) did not determine the result. That case concerned permanent closure of a bespoke route and lacked the distinct aim here of easing local-authority pressures and allowing time for reform. The temporary suspension was not pointless merely because some applicants might qualify under Appendix FM.
4. Children’s duty and equality. The duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 applied to children in the United Kingdom, including the limited cohort in split families. Their best interests were identified and weighed against the public interest; the assessment was brief and unimpressive but lawful. The decision to prepare changes to the Immigration Rules was preparation of an instrument made under an enactment within paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 3 to the Equality Act 2010. Accordingly, section 29(6) did not apply and section 149(1)(a) was not engaged, but the duties in section 149(1)(b) and (c) remained relevant. The temporary, urgent context and the assessment of differential impacts meant those duties were met.
5. Other grounds. A politician’s predisposition to a policy outcome was distinct from unlawful predetermination with a closed mind; the evidence established the former, not the latter. The Article 14 claim failed: the suspension pursued a legitimate public-resource objective, was rationally connected to it, no less intrusive adequate measure was required, and the fair balance favoured the decision. The Article 8 claim likewise failed, as the temporary suspension did not breach the positive obligation to facilitate family reunion. The disability-discrimination ground was barred by the same statutory exception and, in any event, faced evidential and proportionality difficulties.