Andreea-Maria Tobosaru v Court of Law Craiolva, Romania

For conviction extradition under the Extradition Act 2003, where the requesting state seeks surrender to serve one operative sentence of at least four months imposed for the conduct as a whole, the section 65(3)(c) threshold is met without allocating the term among individual offences. Aggregation, merger or cumulation, identifiable components, and the exclusion of some conduct for want of dual criminality do not require the executing court to reconstruct the sentence; the specialty principle protects against service for excluded conduct. Pilecki v Poland [2008] 1 WLR 325 remains binding after Assange Swedish Prosecution Authority (Nos 1 and 2) [2012] UKSC 22, because its rule rests on domestic statutory language, purpose and extradition principles. Under Article 8, only exceptional circumstances displace the strong public interest in extradition; ordinary separation and hardship do not suffice without unusual features.

Andreea-Maria Tobosaru v Court of Law Craiolva, Romania and Mr Tofan’s joined appeal arose from orders extraditing the appellants to Romania on conviction warrants. Ms Tobosaru faced a four-month merged sentence for fireworks offences, although only some of the underlying conduct met the dual-criminality requirement. Mr Tofan appealed against the warrant relating to a five-month cumulative sentence made up of shorter terms.

Both appellants argued that section 65(3)(c) required a sentence of at least four months for each extraditable offence, and that extradition would be disproportionate under the European Convention on Human Rights. The common issue was whether the District Judges were wrong to apply Pilecki v Poland [2008] 1 WLR 325 to the sentence threshold. The High Court also considered whether Assange Swedish Prosecution Authority (Nos 1 and 2) [2012] UKSC 22 had undermined that approach.

Both appeals were dismissed.

1. Sentence threshold. Under the Extradition Act 2003, the court must identify which offences in the warrant satisfy the extradition-offence requirements. If the requesting state seeks surrender to serve one final sentence of at least four months imposed for the conduct as a whole, section 65(3)(c) does not require the court to allocate parts of that sentence to individual offences. That remains so where the sentence was aggregated, merged or cumulated, its components are identifiable, or some underlying conduct fails dual criminality. The specialty principle protects against service for excluded conduct. The court applied Pilecki v Poland [2008] 1 WLR 325 and the approach stated in District Court in Wroclaw, Poland v Horbacz [2019] EWHC 1071 (Admin). It also considered the threshold consistent with Andrysiewicz v Poland [2025] UKSC 23. The four-month sentence for Ms Tobosaru and the five-month sentence for Mr Tofan therefore met the condition.
2. Continuing authority. The rule in Pilecki v Poland did not depend on an EU-law duty to interpret domestic law consistently with framework decisions. Criminal proceedings against Pupino [2006] QB 83 was relevant to that EU-law principle, but Assange Swedish Prosecution Authority (Nos 1 and 2) [2012] UKSC 22 clarified that the principle did not override domestic statutory language. The common-law presumption that legislation complies with international obligations remained, subject to Parliament’s words. The court held that Pilecki v Poland remained binding because its reasoning rested on the statutory scheme and established extradition principles. Tega v Romania [2024] EWHC 2269 (Admin) was distinguishable: one offence there carried a separate sentence outside the aggregation.
3. Appeal and Article 8. On statutory construction the appellate court applied its own judgment. On the Article 8 evaluations, it would intervene for legal misdirection, failure to consider a material matter, reliance on an immaterial matter, or a conclusion not reasonably open on the evidence. It would not interfere merely because it might have struck the balance differently. Extradition engaged private and family life, but the strong public interest in honouring extradition obligations and preventing impunity could be displaced only by exceptional circumstances. The evidence disclosed no exceptional dependency, vulnerability, caring responsibilities or consequences beyond ordinary extradition hardship. A short sentence did not weaken the public interest and could mitigate the duration of the interference.
4. Use of artificial intelligence in legal research. In the postscript, the court noted that false authorities had appeared in formal submissions but had been identified before the hearing and had not affected the appeals. The court accepted the apology and recorded the corrective steps. It observed that AI-assisted legal research may be beneficial, but requires appropriate oversight and verification of authorities before filing.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — Permission to appeal was granted on paper by Mrs Justice Williams on 18 September 2025, and the appeals were joined. Mr Justice Sweeting dismissed both appeals: [2026] EWHC 1720 (Admin) .
2. District Judges — DJ Zani ordered Ms Tobosaru’s extradition on 23 April 2025. DJ Pilling ordered Mr Tofan’s extradition on 13 May 2025.