J (A Child) (Removal to Pakistan), Re

On an application to prevent a child’s removal abroad, the child’s welfare is paramount and requires a global, holistic assessment of the realistic care options. The assessment includes the child’s wishes, safety, emotional and physical needs, education, stability and the likely effect of change. Parents’ views may inform the evidence but do not create a competing legal principle. A prohibited steps order restricts parental responsibility and requires objective evidence, good cause and stated reasons. Its duration should be finite and expressed in the order. The court may weigh supported family care or foster care against the risks of return, while respecting the statutory limits on directing local-authority accommodation.

J, nearly 15, applied under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 for orders preventing his parents from taking him from England to live in Pakistan. He had returned to England after travelling to Pakistan with his father and said he had been misled about the trip and did not wish to live there. His parents sought his return, while J said he would prefer foster care in England to living with his father in Pakistan. The court considered the competing care options, the risk of further harm, J’s wishes and the prospect of kinship or local-authority care.

1. Welfare assessment. J’s welfare was paramount under the Children Act 1989. The court had to compare the realistic options through a global, holistic assessment, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each. The approach in Re G (A Child) (Care Order: Proportionality) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 and Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1147 supported that evaluation. The court also applied the principle in Re S (Wardship: Removal to Ghana) [2025] EWCA Civ 1011: parents’ views may be relevant evidence, but they do not create a competing principle to the child’s welfare.
2. Restriction on parental responsibility. A prohibited steps order is a statutory restriction and must rest on objective evidence, good cause and stated reasons. The court applied H v A (No 1) [2015] EWFC 58 and Re C (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 1412. The order must also have a considered, finite duration, as addressed in R (Casey) v Restormel Borough Council [2007] EWHC 2554 (Admin).
3. Application to J. J’s wishes to remain in England were consistent, authentic and expressed with maturity. The court gave them significant weight. It found that he had suffered significant emotional harm from conflict, abuse, threats of removal and scapegoating. There was a high risk of further emotional harm if he returned to his father’s care in Pakistan; physical harm remained a possible risk, though the court did not resolve the allegations of physical abuse. The arrangements for J in Pakistan were uncertain, and there was no evidence that another relative could protect him. In England, there was a realistic prospect of kinship care with local-authority support. If that could not be arranged, a foster placement near his school was a manageable alternative and preferable to the identified risks in Pakistan.
4. Orders and limits. The court granted the application and prohibited J’s removal from England and Wales to live in Pakistan until he reaches 18. It continued wardship until the next hearing to address consequential orders. Under section 100(2) of the Children Act 1989, the court could not use its inherent jurisdiction to require local-authority accommodation or supervise J’s care arrangements.

This was a first-instance determination. Earlier steps in the proceedings included an order warding J and appointing a litigation friend on 14 August 2025, passport orders on 21 August 2025, and return orders on 3 September 2025. Directions for welfare reports followed in October 2025 and April 2026.