Maidstone Borough Council v Fred King

Civil contempt for breach of a court order is established only where the applicant proves, to the criminal standard, notice, the prohibited act or required omission, knowledge of the material facts and a deliberate rather than inadvertent breach. A contemnor cannot answer a final order by saying that compliance is difficult, alternative accommodation is unavailable, or that others’ welfare makes non-compliance preferable. Admissions narrow issues and attract credit, but do not confine the court’s fact-finding unless accepted as an agreed basis. Sentencing is fact-specific. It may combine punishment for past defiance with coercion to secure compliance, and a custodial term may be suspended on conditions. A breach not particularised in the contempt application should not increase the punitive sentence.

Maidstone Borough Council applied to commit Fred King for civil contempt arising from an Interim Order and a Final Order made in planning enforcement proceedings concerning Warren Lands. The Interim Order restricted caravans and development on the Site. The Final Order prohibited residential use and required the removal of caravans, vehicles, hardstanding, lighting and a steel structure.

Mr King admitted breaches but argued that admissions made at an earlier hearing limited the facts available for sentencing and that he faced practical difficulty in securing accommodation for occupants, including family members and children. The court considered whether the alleged contempts were proved, the effect of the admissions, Mr King’s responsibility and ability to comply, and the appropriate punitive and coercive sentence.

The application was granted. The court found the alleged breaches proved to the criminal standard and imposed a six-month sentence of imprisonment, suspended on conditions designed to secure compliance.

1. Proof and admissions. Applying FW Farnsworth v Lacy [2013] EWHC 3487 (Ch), the court held that contempt by breach required proof of notice, the prohibited act or omission, intention, knowledge of the material facts and a deliberate rather than inadvertent breach. An intention to flout the order was unnecessary. Admissions made at an earlier hearing were not an agreed basis of plea. Applying R v Newton (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 388 and R v Underwood [2004] EWCA Crim 2256, the court remained responsible for fair fact-finding and sentencing.
2. Continuing obligation. The Final Order was valid, unappealed and capable of compliance. Difficulty in finding accommodation, or a belief that continued occupation was best for the occupants, did not excuse non-compliance. Mr King remained responsible because he controlled the Site and had caused or permitted the relevant caravans, vehicles and works to remain there. A hardstanding breach was proved but was not taken into account in the punitive sentence because it was not particularised in the contempt application.
3. Sentencing principles. The court applied the guidance in Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15, Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch), JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (No 2) [2011] EWCA Civ 1241 and Financial Conduct Authority v McKendrick [2019] EWCA Civ 524. The sentence had both punitive and coercive purposes. The contempts were deliberate, continuing and serious, with high culpability and medium-to-high harm. Only custody was sufficient, but admissions, the apology and late attempts to comply attracted maximum credit.
4. Order. The court imposed six months’ imprisonment, divided equally between punitive and coercive elements. The sentence was suspended until 29 July 2028. If the Final Order was fully complied with by 28 January 2027, the coercive element would not be served and the punitive element would remain suspended. Otherwise the six-month sentence could be activated. Any further breach before 29 July 2028 could also result in activation.

This was a first-instance committal application. The judgment records that the planning appeals were dismissed by an Inspector on 29 October 2024 and that the Final Order was never appealed. The present court determined the contempt and sentence.