HM Solicitor General v Stephen Yaxley-Lennon

Court injunctions must be obeyed unless and until discharged, even where the respondent considers them wrongly made or contrary to the evidence. In contempt proceedings for breach of an injunction, the court determines compliance and sanction; it does not relitigate the underlying dispute or review the injunction.

Sanction is assessed by seriousness, culpability, harm, mitigation, totality and the need for future compliance. Custody must be the shortest term commensurate with the contempt. An admitted breach may attract a reduction, but the reduction depends on when the admission is made. A sanction may contain punitive and coercive elements.

The defendant had been restrained by an injunction granted after a libel trial from publishing specified allegations about the claimant. The injunction was not appealed.

The HM Solicitor General brought two contempt applications alleging ten breaches, including publication of the film Silenced and statements made in interviews and online broadcasts. The defendant had failed to attend an earlier directions hearing, left the jurisdiction, and was arrested under a warrant. At the hearing he admitted all ten breaches. The issues were whether the injunction could support contempt proceedings, the appropriate sanction, and costs.

1. Contempt established. The defendant admitted ten breaches of the injunction. The order clearly prohibited publication, authorisation or procurement of the specified allegations and similar allegations conveying the same defamatory sting. The court was satisfied that the defendant knew the order, its terms and the consequences of breach.
2. Role of the court. Injunctions must be obeyed in a society governed by the rule of law. A respondent may appeal, disagree with or criticise an injunction, but may not decide for himself that it should be ignored. In contempt proceedings the court determines the alleged breach in accordance with law and procedure. It does not reopen the libel trial, review the factual findings or reconsider the decision to grant the injunction.
3. Service. The defendant’s presence when the injunction was made and his subsequent knowledge of its terms meant that lack of personal service did not bar contempt proceedings. In any event, the steps taken to bring the order to his attention amounted to good service, and personal service was dispensed with.
4. Sanction. Applying the approach summarised in HM Attorney General v Crosland, the court assessed culpability and harm, considered whether a fine was sufficient, and applied mitigation, totality, the late admissions and time in custody. The breaches were planned, deliberate, flagrant and sustained, with the defendant playing a leading role. Their primary harm was to the administration of justice. Each breach crossed the custody threshold, but the ten breaches were assessed together to avoid disproportionate aggregation.
5. The appropriate term before credit for admissions and custody was 20 months. A one-tenth reduction for admissions made at the hearing and a three-day allowance for time already spent in custody produced a term of 18 months less three days. Immediate custody was necessary. Four months of the term was coercive and could be remitted if the defendant demonstrated commitment to compliance, including taking steps to remove the offending publications. The defendant was ordered to pay the applications’ costs, subject to detailed assessment, with payment on account to be determined on written representations.

First-instance contempt decision. The judgment states that the defendant has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) under section 13(2)(c) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, read with section 53(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.