HM Attorney General v Yaxley-Lennon (Rev 2)

A person reporting legal proceedings commits contempt by breaching a reporting restriction order where the person deliberately publishes a prohibited report and is subjectively reckless as to whether publication breaches the order. Actual knowledge of its terms and a specific intention to interfere with justice are unnecessary. Earlier publication of the information creates no public-domain exception.

A publication seriously impedes justice where it creates a real and substantial risk of harassment or intimidation affecting defendants’ ability to participate properly in their trial. Aggressively confronting and filming court participants may also constitute common law contempt. Contravention of the statutory prohibition on court photography becomes contempt only where its nature and context cross the required threshold of seriousness.

The Attorney General sought the respondent’s committal for conduct outside Leeds Crown Court while a jury was considering verdicts in a criminal trial. The respondent confronted and filmed defendants, made prejudicial comments, encouraged viewers to harass a defendant and live-streamed the material to a large online audience.

The alleged contempts were: breach of a postponement order made under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981; breach of the strict liability rule; and direct common law interference with the administration of justice.

An earlier committal had been quashed for procedural defects by the Court of Appeal in [2018] EWCA Crim 1856. After the remitted procedure proved unsuitable for resolving disputed evidence, the Attorney General commenced adversarial proceedings in the Divisional Court.

1. All three allegations of contempt were proved. The respondent knowingly reported proceedings covered by the postponement order. The order remained binding while in force and could not be challenged for validity in the committal proceedings. It contained no implied exception for information that had previously entered the public domain.

2. Actual knowledge of the order’s precise terms was unnecessary. Subjective recklessness, as defined in R v G [2003] UKHL 50, was sufficient. A reporter who foresees that publication may breach an order but takes an unreasonable risk commits contempt. A person who knows or suspects that an order exists is put on inquiry. Specific intent to interfere with justice is also unnecessary. On the facts, the respondent knew that a restriction existed and deliberately published without taking the reasonable steps identified by court staff.

3. The strict liability allegation was established. Impeding justice is distinct from prejudicing a jury and concerns the whole process of justice, not merely the outcome. The broadcast encouraged harassment of identifiable defendants and created a real and substantial risk that they would feel intimidated, distracted or unable to participate properly during the closing stages of their trial. Social media’s speed, reach and absence of moderation materially increased that risk.

4. The aggressive and provocative confrontation of defendants arriving at court constituted direct common law interference with justice. The protection afforded to people attending court extends beyond physical molestation to intimidating verbal conduct which risks disturbing their ability to discharge their functions.

5. The filming also contravened section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925. Such a contravention is not automatically contempt. Here, the targeted, persistent filming, live publication, aggressive confrontation, prejudicial commentary and encouragement of harassment cumulatively crossed the necessary threshold of seriousness. Deliberate conduct was sufficient; knowledge of the statutory provision or a specific intent to interfere was unnecessary.

6. Article 10 did not protect the conduct. Sanctions were necessary and proportionate to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and safeguarding due process.

1. High Court, Divisional Court: granted the Attorney General permission to pursue three grounds and found each contempt proved.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): in [2018] EWCA Crim 1856, quashed the Leeds committal for procedural defects and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing. It refused an extension of time concerning the earlier Canterbury committal.
3. Central Criminal Court: the Recorder of London held that the summary procedure under Part 48 of the Criminal Procedure Rules was unsuitable because substantial factual disputes required adversarial investigation, and referred the matter to the Attorney General.
4. Crown Court at Leeds: initially committed the respondent for contempt and activated an earlier suspended committal order.