Attorney General v Dallas

A juror commits contempt where the juror deliberately disobeys a judicial direction and thereby creates a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice. A juror must decide the case solely upon evidence presented in court. Independent internet research about the case, followed by disclosure of the resulting information to fellow jurors, violates that obligation.

Unless the Crown Court exceptionally deals with contempt immediately of its own motion, alleged contempt by or affecting a Crown Court jury should be pursued by the Attorney General through committal proceedings under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Trial for contempt on indictment is obsolete. Juror misuse of the internet is always a most serious irregularity, for which an immediate custodial sentence is virtually inevitable.

The Attorney General applied under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court to commit the defendant for contempt committed while she served as a juror in a Crown Court trial. Despite express directions not to conduct internet research, she searched for information about the accused's previous conviction and disclosed to fellow jurors that it had involved an allegation of rape. That information exceeded the limited bad-character evidence admitted at trial.

The disclosure disturbed the other jurors. The jury was discharged, the complainant had to give evidence at a retrial, and additional public expense was incurred. The defendant denied deliberately flouting the directions and maintained that she had not fully understood them.

The court determined the proper procedure for trying the alleged contempt, whether deliberate disobedience creating a risk of prejudice had been proved to the criminal standard, and the appropriate sentence.

1. The application was granted. The defendant was guilty of contempt of court, proved to the criminal standard. She was sentenced to six months' immediate imprisonment and would serve three months. There was no order for costs.

2. Trial for contempt on indictment is obsolete and of historical interest only. Neither the Attorney General nor an alleged contemnor has a right to seek jury trial on indictment. Unless the Crown Court exceptionally deals immediately with contempt of its own motion, contempt by or affecting a Crown Court juror should be pursued by the Attorney General through committal proceedings under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. The court applied the approach endorsed in In Re Lonrho plc [1990] 2 AC 154. [2]–[7]

3. The applicable test was whether a juror deliberately disobeyed a direction of the trial judge and thereby created a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice. The defendant was highly intelligent, articulate in English and aware that the judge had unequivocally directed the jury not to seek information about the case online. Her account that she had encountered the newspaper article accidentally was not credible. She deliberately disobeyed the direction. [35]–[39]

4. The defendant created prejudice when she armed herself with potentially relevant material which had not been admitted in evidence and which could have influenced her verdict. She caused further prejudice when she disclosed that material to the other jurors. The jury consequently had to be discharged and a retrial ordered. [38]

5. Elementary justice entitles both prosecution and defence to a verdict based only upon evidence presented at trial. Jurors cannot select which principles of jury trial or judicial directions they will obey. Modern communication technology does not alter those principles. The observations in R v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570 were applied. [40]–[42]

6. Internet misuse by a juror is always a most serious irregularity. An effective custodial sentence is virtually inevitable because punishment must protect the integrity of jury trial. The defendant's good character, lack of personal gain or improper agenda, career consequences, health concerns and apology were mitigating considerations. They did not justify suspending the sentence, particularly because she had not admitted guilt. [43]–[48]

This was a first-instance committal application. The alleged contempt arose in a Crown Court trial whose jury was discharged after the defendant's conduct was reported. The accused was subsequently convicted following a retrial. [20]–[25]