HM Solicitor General v Cox & Anor

Deliberately taking photographs in court contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1925, and deliberately publishing illegally taken images, may amount to criminal contempt as well as statutory offences. The conduct creates serious risks to the administration of justice, including disruption, intimidation, abuse of participants and undermining confidence in the authority of the court.

For contempt in the face of the court, or conduct closely connected with it, the required mens rea is deliberate conduct which breaches the criminal law, or a knowing and deliberate breach of a court order. No further specific intention to impede the administration of justice is required. In any event, such an intention may be inferred where the contemnor knowingly flouts a prohibition designed to protect court proceedings.

The Solicitor General commenced committal proceedings, with permission granted by the Divisional Court, against two young men who took photographs at Bristol Crown Court using mobile phones.

One respondent photographed a friend during a video-link hearing and then photographed Ryan Sheppard during sentencing for murder. He posted an image of Sheppard on Facebook with supportive and abusive comments. The other respondent photographed a judge in court, posted that image with an abusive comment, and published the image of Sheppard on his own Facebook page.

The respondents disputed whether their conduct constituted contempt and, in particular, whether contempt required a specific intention to impede or prejudice the administration of justice.

1. The committal application succeeded. Both respondents were guilty of criminal contempt. Deliberately taking prohibited photographs in court, and deliberately publishing illegally taken images, interfered with the proper administration of justice and created serious risks to it.

2. The statutory offences under section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 did not exclude contempt jurisdiction. Illegal photography in court risks disruption, intimidation and misuse of images of participants. The court notices prohibiting mobile-phone use and photography were court-approved orders protecting proceedings. Publication aggravated the original contempt and showed a successful flouting of the law and the court’s authority.

3. The fact that the sentencing hearing had ended before publication did not remove the risk. The administration of justice includes the protection of victims, witnesses, jurors, court staff and the judiciary from intimidation, abuse and the use of unlawful images to belittle criminal proceedings.

4. The court followed the approach in R v Vincent D (Contempt of Court: Illegal Photography) [2004] EWCA Crim 1271 and R v Ivanov [2013] EWCA Crim 614. Actual disruption or a proven purpose to disrupt was unnecessary. The court also accepted the reasoning in Robertson and Gough v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 63 that mens rea can be established by an intention to do the act which the law treats as contempt.

5. For contempt in the face of the court, and closely related conduct, no specific intent beyond a deliberate breach of the criminal law or a knowing and deliberate breach of a protective court order was required. A different approach may apply to publication contempts not involving such conduct. In any event, the first respondent knew photography was prohibited and intended to risk interference with the administration of justice; that was proved to the criminal standard.

6. Sentence was adjourned for a further hearing.

Committal proceedings were brought with the permission of the Divisional Court (Irwin and Foskett JJ), granted on 20 October 2015. No appeal history is stated in the judgment.