HM Solicitor General v Mayfield

A deliberate breach of a restricted reporting order may constitute contempt of court even where the order contains no penal notice. Subjective recklessness as to the order is sufficient; actual knowledge of its precise terms and a specific intention to interfere with the administration of justice are unnecessary.

Taking and publishing photographs or video at court may also constitute contempt where the conduct is deliberate and inherently likely to interfere with the administration of justice. In sentencing, culpability and harm are the starting points. Serious contempt may pass the custody threshold, but a custodial sentence may properly be suspended where mitigation, delay and rehabilitation prospects justify that course.

The Solicitor General applied to commit Katie Mayfield for contempt of court. The allegations concerned breaches of a restricted reporting order made under section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, and taking and publishing photographs and video in breach of section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925.

The defendant admitted the essential conduct and accepted that it amounted to contempt, but the court had to determine whether the disputed matters were proved to the criminal standard, whether the contempt was sufficiently serious to warrant custody, and, if so, the appropriate sentence.

1. Contempt established. The court was sure that the defendant had breached the restricted reporting order by naming protected witnesses in Facebook posts. The posts were manifestly likely to identify them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings.
2. A breach of an order made under section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 may amount to contempt even without a penal notice. Subjective recklessness is sufficient. A person who knows or suspects that an order exists is put on inquiry and may be reckless by failing to take reasonable steps to ascertain its terms. No specific intent to interfere with the administration of justice is required.
3. The taking and publication of photographs and video at court, contrary to section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, may constitute contempt where the conduct is deliberate and inherently likely to interfere with the administration of justice. The defendant’s conduct was deliberate, knowing and serious.
4. Sentence. Seriousness is assessed principally by culpability and harm, including the purpose of the contempt and the risk to the process of justice. Relevant factors included the effect or potential consequences of disclosure, the scale and medium of publication, the gravity of the underlying proceedings, culpability, remorse, mitigation and personal circumstances.
5. The contempt passed the custody threshold. The minimum term reflecting the gravity of each count was six months, reduced to 18 weeks by mitigation and then by one third for the defendant’s admissions. Having regard to delay, health, caring responsibilities, the absence of further offending and rehabilitation prospects, the court imposed 12 weeks’ imprisonment on each count, concurrent and suspended for two years. Further prohibited publication during that period would breach the suspension condition.

First-instance committal proceedings in the High Court. Permission to bring the proceedings had been granted by Johnson J on 19 November 2020.