His Majesty's Solicitor General v Jason-Steven: Wong

Covertly recording a family-court hearing without permission constitutes contempt under section 9(1)(a) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 where the recording was deliberate. The prosecution need not prove a specific intention to interfere with the administration of justice, or knowledge that the recording was prohibited. Knowingly disposing of the recording for publication constitutes a further contempt under section 9(1)(b). Publishing information from private adoption proceedings may also constitute contempt under section 12(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The protection of privacy in adoption proceedings continues after the substantive proceedings have ended. A claimed public-interest purpose does not justify covert recording or publication.

The Solicitor General sought the committal of the defendant for contempt arising from a February 2022 hearing in private in adoption proceedings concerning his child. The defendant admitted making an audio recording and passing it to another person, who published it on YouTube together with material relating to the proceedings.

The application was brought under Parts 19 and 37 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The central issues were whether the defendant had deliberately recorded the hearing, whether he had disposed of the recording with a view to publication, whether publication of information from the private proceedings engaged section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, and whether intent to interfere with the administration of justice was required.

1. Contempt established. The court found beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly brought a hand-held recording device into court and deliberately recorded the entire hearing. He then disposed of the recording to Andrew Devine, who published it on YouTube. The conduct fell within section 9(1)(a) and (b) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and the publication also amounted to publication for the purposes of section 12(1)(a) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (paras [63]-[67]).
2. The strict-liability provisions in sections 1 and 2 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 were not relevant to the section 9 contempts. The mental element required was deliberate use of a recording instrument and knowing disposal of the recording with a view to publication. A specific intention to interfere with the administration of justice, or knowledge that recording or publication was prohibited, was unnecessary (para [55]).
3. The court rejected the argument that publication was permissible because the proceedings were no longer active. The reasoning in Attorney General v Pelling established that publication of material from private proceedings may remain contemptuous after the proceedings have concluded, because the wider interests of justice and the protection of children continue to be engaged (paras [61], [70]-[71]).
4. The asserted public-interest purpose of exposing alleged wrongdoing was irrelevant to liability. The court adopted the approach in HM Attorney General v Paterson that such a defence was beside the point (para [68]). The alleged defects in the constitution or authenticity of the underlying hearing, and the alleged error in the adoption proceedings, were rejected as baseless or inconsequential (paras [60], [62]).
5. The court listed a further hearing to determine sanction and reminded the defendant of his entitlement to publicly funded legal representation (para [72]).