HM Solicitor General v Katarzyna Paczkowska

For contempt under section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant deliberately made an unauthorised recording and, where alleged, deliberately disposed of it with a view to publication. Knowledge that recording or publication was prohibited, or an intention to interfere with the administration of justice, is not required.

Continuing public dissemination after clear notice of the prohibition materially increases culpability. Where deliberate defiance is sufficiently serious, imprisonment may be appropriate, but suspension can be justified by removal of the material, absence of an intention to repeat the conduct and evidence of anxiety or other personal mitigation.

The Solicitor General brought contempt proceedings under CPR Part 81 concerning unauthorised recordings of Employment Tribunal proceedings and their subsequent publication on a website and Twitter account. Permission to make the application had been granted under CPR rule 81.3(5)(a).

The defendant disputed the contempts and advanced wider complaints about the Employment Tribunal proceedings. The central issues were whether the statutory elements of recording and publication were proved to the criminal standard, whether knowledge of the prohibition or an intention to interfere with justice was necessary, and what sanction and costs order should follow.

1. Contempts proved. The court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had made unauthorised recordings in the Employment Tribunal and had later placed the recordings and transcript on her publicly accessible website. The first contempt was therefore proved under section 9(1)(a) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The second was proved under section 9(1)(b), because publication continued for more than three months after clear warnings that it constituted contempt.
2. Mental element. The prosecution had to prove that the defendant deliberately used an instrument for recording sound and deliberately disposed of the recording with a view to publication. There was no additional requirement to prove knowledge that the conduct was prohibited or an intention to interfere with the administration of justice. The defendant’s lack of knowledge therefore did not answer the first allegation.
3. Motivation and harm. The defendant’s genuine belief that she had been disadvantaged or treated unfairly did not justify the conduct. Her motivation was relevant only to sanction. The absence of proven actual impact on the integrity of the proceedings, and the absence of reporting restrictions or anonymity orders, reduced the harm but did not eliminate the contempt.
4. Sanction. The contempts were at the upper end of seriousness. Deliberate and prolonged defiance, together with public advertising of the recordings and the risk of rapid dissemination, meant that a fine was insufficient. The appropriate sentence was three months’ imprisonment. Immediate custody was not warranted because the recordings had been removed, there was no evidence of repetition being intended, and the defendant suffered from anxiety. The sentence was suspended for one year.
5. The defendant was ordered to pay the Solicitor General’s costs of £8,591 inclusive of VAT within 14 days.