R v John Jordan

Contempt in the face of the court includes deliberate conduct which creates a real, rather than remote, risk of interfering with the due administration of justice. The interference must be serious, but need not be grave or actually cause prejudice.

For contempt by disruption, specific intent to disrupt is not an element of liability. The summary jurisdiction must be exercised fairly and with restraint, but procedural guidance is not inflexible. Where the ingredients of contempt are proved, the finding will ordinarily itself establish the proportionality of an interference with Convention rights made to protect the administration of justice.

The appellant played amplified music from a park behind Inner London Crown Court while a defendant was giving evidence in a jury trial. The music was heard in the courtroom, caused the jury to withdraw, distracted a juror, and affected another courtroom.

HHJ Reid dealt with the matter summarily. After a written charge, legal advice, representation and an inquiry, he found the appellant in contempt and imposed 14 days’ committal, suspended for 12 months subject to protective conditions.

The appellant appealed under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. He challenged the seriousness of the conduct, the finding of intent, procedural fairness and impartiality, the penalty, and compatibility with articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant’s loud music created a real and substantial risk of interfering with a jury trial and caused actual, significant disruption. That crossed the gravity threshold for contempt in the face of the court.

2. Specific intent to disrupt proceedings was not an ingredient of liability for this species of contempt. Deliberate conduct which creates the relevant interference or risk is sufficient. The judge’s finding that the appellant did intend disruption was therefore legally unnecessary, but it was in any event safely reached.

3. The judge was entitled to act promptly. The summary process was fairly conducted: the appellant received a clear written allegation, time to reflect, legal advice and representation, and an opportunity to give evidence and make submissions. Compliance with Part 48 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 will ordinarily meet fundamental fairness requirements, although minor departures do not automatically invalidate a committal order.

4. There was no apparent bias. A judge may determine a contempt arising from events personally observed. On these facts the disruptive events observed by the judge were not disputed, and a fair-minded and informed observer would not find a real possibility of bias.

5. The suspended committal order was just and proportionate. The serious interference, absence of remorse or insight, and risk of repetition entitled the judge to conclude that a short custodial committal, suspended on protective conditions, was necessary.

6. Article 11 was not engaged because the appellant acted alone. The music did not plainly convey information or ideas so as to engage article 10. If either right was engaged, the interference was justified by the exceptionally important aims of protecting ongoing criminal proceedings and the rights of those on trial. Contempt in the face of the court is an offence for which proof of its ingredients ordinarily establishes proportionality; no separate fact-specific proportionality assessment was required.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal in [2024] EWCA Crim 229.
• Crown Court at Inner London: HHJ Reid found John Jordan in contempt of court and imposed 14 days’ committal, suspended for 12 months on conditions.